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INTRODUCTION
ustice is rightly known as the “road to peace.”1 One might
go further and say that it is peace’s home.2 Outside of the
confines of justice among peoples, peace is endangered, and war
seems to be inevitable.
The pioneers of international law recognized this fact. Hugo
Grotius referred to injustice as a “grounds for war,” because in-
ternational “peace is made with a view to the security of every
individual subject.”3 Similarly, the founders of the U.S. Consti-
tution saw the law of nations as guaranteeing world peace.4 A
key purpose of the United Nations is to settle international dis-
putes peacefully according to justice and the rule of law.5 Raph-
ael Lemkin, the founder of the Genocide Convention, maintained
that the origins of genocide are to be found in a nation’s laws.6
1. John J. Gilligan, Law, the Path to Justice; Justice, the Road to Peace, 19
DENVER J. OF INT’L L. & POL’Y 77 (1990).
2. “Language is the house of being. In its home human beings dwell. Those
who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home.”
MARTINHEIDEGGER, PATHMARKS 239 (William McNeil ed., 1998).
3. HUGOGROTIUS, 3 THERIGHTS OFWAR AND PEACE, INCLUDING THE LAW OF
NATURE AND OF NATIONS 365−67 (A.C. Campbell ed., and trans., 1814),
https://books.google.it/books?id=n9M8AAAAYAAJ&pg=PA367.
4. See MARKW. JANIS, AMERICA AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: 1776 – 1939, at
37−38 (2010).
5. See U.N. Charter, art. I(1); Amit K. Chhabra, Autumnal Rage: Playing
with Islamic Fire, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 389, 401 (2013) (citing U.N. Charter,
art. I(1)).
6. See Case W. Res. Sch. L., To Prevent and to Punish: Commemorating the
60th Anniversary of the Genocide Convention, YOUTUBE (Sept. 28, 2007),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6cBuFLHEdrY. Echoing Lemkin, the U.N.
Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide has urged all parties to the Gen-
ocide Convention to outlaw the predicate acts that lead to genocide by imple-
menting in their “domestic legislation” the core human-rights treaties,
namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
J
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Advisers to the contemporary U.S. military believe that atrocity
prevention requires “peaceful redress of grievances,” regularly
established courts, and the rule of law.7
The sweeping ruling in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum8 rep-
resents the culmination of a decade-long campaign to establish
a unitary executive power over matters of international law, and
to marginalize the courts, law, and treaties. Victims of mass
atrocities and their descendants have suffered from this trend
toward greater impunity.9 The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) barely
survived its last encounter with the Supreme Court in 2004, and
its usefulness has eroded steadily since that time, in a number
of cases dealing with China, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
and Sudan.10 Advocates for human rights, victimized groups,
and genocide prevention have consistently supported the right
of victims of mass atrocities to pursue lawsuits under the law of
nations in countries other than those in which the extermination
or persecution occurred.11 The law is being politicized as amicus
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISER OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK: A GUIDE FOR STATES 2−4
(2012), http://aipr.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/foa-for-states-english.pdf.
7. SARAH SEWALL, ET AL., MARO: MASS ATROCITY RESPONSEOPERATIONS: A
MILITARY PLANNING HANDBOOK 107 (2010), available at
http://www.ntis.gov/search/product.aspx%3FABBR%3DADA525455.
8. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660–61 (2013).
9. The United States has defined a “mass atrocity” as a widespread or sys-
tematic use of violence against civilians by state or non-state actors. See
SEWALL, supra note 7, at 17; Maureen S. Hiebert,MARO as the Partial Opera-
tionalization of R2P, 6 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION: AN INT’L J. 52, 53–54
(2011); Henry Theriault, The MARO Handbook: New Possibilities or the Same
Old Militarism, 6 GENOCIDE STUD. PREVENTION: AN INT’L J., 7, 26 (2011).
10. See infra notes 15, 73-188 and accompanying text. See also Beth Ste-
phens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door Is Still Ajar” for Human
Rights, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533 (2004).
11. Cf. Br. for Center for Constitutional Rights, Int’l Human Rights Org.
and Int’l Law Experts as Amici Curiae Supp. Pet’rs, at 35–36, Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2011) (No. 10-1491, 11-88); Br. for
Earthrights Int’l as Amicus Curiae Supp. Pet’rs, at 8–9, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659
(No. 10-1491); Br. for Int’l Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supp. Pet’rs, at 17–
18, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2794;
Br. for Nuremberg Historians as Amici Curiae Supp. Pet’rs, passim, Kiobel,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2795; Br. for Int’l
Human Rights Org. and Int’l Law Experts as Amici Curiae Supp. Pet’rs, at 25,
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2795; Br.
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briefs by the Department of Justice and “Statements of Interest”
by the State Department override the rules of the law of nations,
not to mention the intent of the American founders and basic
principles of justice and fairness.12
The Roberts Court selected a case arising out of Nigeria, fea-
turing a company with a generally glowing reputation in the
United States, to restrict judicial remedies for mass atrocities to
for Nuremberg Scholars Omer Bartov et al. as Amici Curiae Supp. Pet’rs, Ki-
obel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491, 11-88), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2814;
Br. for Professor JuanMendez, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, as Amicus
Curiae Supp. Pet’rs, at 21–22, Mohamed v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct.
1702 (No. 11-88), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2805; Mot. to File and Br. for
Int’l Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supp. Pet. for Writ of Cert at 16, Kiobel,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1153; Br. for The
International Commission of Jurists and the American Association for the In-
ternational Commission of Jurists as Amici Curiae Supp. Pet’rs, Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (No. 07-0016), cert.
denied, 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1828; Br. for Nuremberg Scholars Omer
Bartov, et al. as Amici Curiae Supp. Pet’rs, Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244
(No. 07-0016), 2009 U.S. Briefs 1262; Br. for Earthrights International as Ami-
cus Curiae Supp. Pet’rs, at 20–21, Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244 (No. 07-
0016), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1826.
12. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–44, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659
(No. 10-1491) (upon being informed that office of the Solicitor General of the
United States now took a narrow view of the Alien Tort Statute, Justice Anto-
nin Scalia pointed out to him that the Supreme Court had heard from his “pre-
decessors as well, and they took a different position. So, you know, why – why
should we defer to the views of—of the current administration?”); id. at 43
(“Why should—why should we listen to you rather than the solicitors general
who took the opposite position . . . in other cases, not only in several courts of
appeals, but even up here?”); id. at 44–45 (Chief Justice John Roberts added
that “Your successors may adopt a different view. And I think—I don’t want to
put words in his mouth, but Justice Scalia’s point means whatever deference
you are entitled to is compromised by the fact that your predecessors took a
different position.”); id. at 47 (Justice Scalia explained that the justices “are
not very good at figuring out the foreign policy interests of the United States.
And, you know, in the past we have tried to get out from under our prior case
law in the sovereign immunity area of asking the State Department. And the
State Department would come in here: This is good; this is bad. We abandoned
all that in the sovereign immunity field. Why should we walk back into it
here?”); see also Derek Baxter, Protecting the Power of the Judiciary: Why the
Use of State Department “Statements of Interests” in Alien Tort Statute Litiga-
tion Runs Afoul of Separation of Powers Concerns, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 807 (2006);
Margarita Clarens, Deference, Human Rights and the Federal Courts: The Role
of the Executive in Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
415, nn. 210−29 & accompanying text (2007).
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a tiny subset of possible cases.13 Nigeria has a fairly good image
in the United States due to its thriving oil exports to this country
in a time of energy insecurity, the success and prominence of
many Nigerian-Americans, and a plethora of positive mass me-
dia references to Nigeria.14 Most other countries out of which
ATS suits have arisen are well-known to be plagued with mass
atrocities, such as Burma, China, Guatemala, Indonesia, Libe-
ria, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Palestine, fascist Paraguay,
13. Fortune placed Shell number 1 in 2012 by revenue. Fortune Global 500,
RANKINGTHEBRANDS.COM, http://www.rankingthebrands.com/The-Brand-
Rankings.aspx?rankingID=50&year=489 (last visited Nov. 16 2014). Market
research firm Interbrand reported in 2012 that Shell had a positive perception
of its environmental practices, despite being an oil company. Jacob Brown, Au-
tomakers Rank as Four of Top 10 “Best Global Green Brands” of 2012,
AUTOMOTIVE.COM (June 28, 2012), http://blogs.automotive.com/automakers-
rank-as-four-of-top-10-best-global-green-brands-of-2012-100687.html. “Mass
atrocities” are defined to include, at a minimum, genocide and the crimes
against humanity of deportation, extermination, and persecution. See JOHN
QUIGLEY, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS 274
(2006). The category is typically used to refer to events such as the mass kill-
ings in German-occupied Europe, ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, and the
massacres in Rwanda in 1994. See id. at 278. It is also used to discuss re-
sponses to transnational criminality under the rubric of genocide prevention
and “the Responsibility to Protect.” See Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to
Protect: The Power of an Idea, Keynote Address at the “International Confer-
ence on the Responsibility to Protect: Stopping Mass Atrocities,” University of
California, Berkeley, (Mar. 14, 2007) (transcript available at www.crisis-
group.org/home/index.cfm?id=4780); See generally SEWALL, supra note 7; U.S.
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT, vi (2010),
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary
on the Visit of President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria to the White House
(June 4, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/06/04/statement-press-secretary-visit-president-goodluck-jona-
than-nigeria-whit) (describing “strong bilateral partnership between U.S. and
Nigeria); Frank Pietrucha, Bootlegging Threatens Nollywood, AMERICA.GOV
BLOGS (Mar. 27, 2009), http://blogs.america.gov/ip/2009/03/27/bootlegging-
threatens-nollywood/ (describing thriving Nigerian film industry); U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, Nigerian President’s Visit Represents Start of New Relationship, IIP
(Dec. 11, 2007), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/arti-
cle/2007/12/20071211130944wcyeroc0.1242945.html; THE WHITE HOUSE, Mrs.
Laura Bush Visits with Nigeria President Olusegun Obasanjo (Jan. 18, 2006),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/01/im-
ages/20060118-1_p011806sc-0044jpg-1-515h.html.
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apartheid South Africa, Somalia, Sudan, and the former Yugo-
slavia.15 The headlines following a decision that the statute may
not be used by the survivors of massacres or mass displacements
from one of these countries, or by their family members, would
have made for much worse headlines and television footage for
the Roberts Court if the case involved Sudan or Burma rather
than Nigeria. Kiobel is a triumph of “hard cases make bad law,”
and a textbook study of how to leverage a hard case into terrible
law for easy cases.
Under an originalist approach to the ATS, reparations for
mass atrocities would be available in a broad variety of situa-
tions. For example, if a multinational mining company know-
ingly facilitated attacks on civilians in Papua New Guinea, it
could be liable for aiding and abetting war crimes, or even geno-
cide, depending on the intent of the party or parties receiving
the aid.16 Large multinational banks and U.S. exporters, by
knowingly fueling, funding, and supplying the government of
apartheid-era South Africa, might be liable for aiding and abet-
ting genocide and the crime against humanity of apartheid,
among other crimes.17 Multinational energy firms that “pur-
chased security services with the knowledge that the security
15. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(Papua New Guinea), vacated and remanded for further consideration in light
of Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2011), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtor-
ders/042213zor_k5fl.pdf; Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254 (2d
Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (South Africa); Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir.
2004) (China); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (Bosnian Serb
Republic); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (Paraguay); Al-
mog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 285–94 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (Pales-
tine); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d
289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Sudan); Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d
1325, 1331−33 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (Chile); Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94
Civ. 3627 (JSM), 1996 WL 164496, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996) (Rwanda);
Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (Haiti); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886
F. Supp. 162, 169 (D. Mass. 1995) (Guatemala). Compared to these easier
cases, Kiobel may have been an exceptional case that was ill-suited to make
law for the world as a whole. Cf. Suja Thomas,How Atypical, Hard Cases Make
Bad Law (See, e.g., The Lack of Judicial Restraint in Twombly, Wal-Mart, and
Ricci), 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 989, 989-902 (2013) (suggesting that when un-
usual facts appear at the Supreme Court level, precedent may be abandoned
and justices may become activist policymakers, with poor results). See gener-
ally infra note 24.
16. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
17. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 285-86 (2d Cir.
2007) (per curiam); id. at 311-26 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting
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forces would, or were likely to, commit international law viola-
tions,” would encounter civil liability as a result.18 Corporations
would internalize more of the costs that they inflict on others
when they lead, plan, facilitate, conspire in, or instigate crimes
by state or non-state actors in violation of the law of nations.19
Moreover, foreign officials subject to service of process and per-
sonal jurisdiction in the United States would have to answer for
genocide, the crimes against humanity of persecution and tor-
ture, aiding and abetting mass-casualty terrorist attacks, or war
crimes such as murder or the wanton destruction of cities.20
in part) (accepting the existence of an emerging international law norm that
holds private parties liable for aiding and abetting genocide, war crimes or
crimes against humanity).
18. Id. at 289–91 (Hall, J., concurring in part) (citing Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,
395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002)).
19. See id. at 272, 281 (Katzman, J., concurring in part) (citing Article 6 of
the London Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 529 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998)).
20. See Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004) (detailing allegations of
religious persecution in China); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)
(endorsing ATS liability of Bosnian Serb leader for genocide, among other vio-
lations of international law); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980) (endorsing ATS liability for torture in Paraguay); Weixum v. Xilai, 568
F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2008) (similar to Ye); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F.
Supp. 2d 257, 285–94 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that there could be ATS liability
on part of multinational banking corporation for aiding and abetting terroristic
genocide against Jews targeted by Palestinian militants); Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (explor-
ing limits of liability on part of multinational oil corporation for aiding and
abetting war crimes in Sudan); Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(similar to Ye and Weixum); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d
538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing ATS liability for aiding and abetting crimes in
South Africa); Zhou v. Peng, 286 F. Supp. 2d 255, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismiss-
ing suit against Chinese officials for human rights violations); Plaintiffs A, B,
C, D, E, F v. Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (similar to Weixum
and Doe v. Qi); Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1331–33
(S.D. Fla. 2002); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(dismissing ATS claims under political question doctrine), rev’d and remanded,
550 F.3d 822, 832 n.10 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that local remedies’ exhaustion
is not always a requirement in ATS cases), further proceedings at 671 F.3d 736
(9th Cir. 2011) (reversing dismissal and remanding for trial on genocide and
war-crimes claims); Ge v. Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (similar
to Zhou); Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 Civ. 3627 (JSM), 1996 WL
164496, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996) (regarding torture, extrajudicial killing,
and genocide in Rwanda); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (in-
volving torture and other crimes in Haiti prior to Aristede era); Xuncax v.
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The Supreme Court’s evisceration of the ATS in Kiobel there-
fore deprived international law of a key pillar of support. It ar-
guably violates the international legal duties of the United
States to prevent, punish, and remedy mass atrocities.21 It con-
flicts with the original understanding of the law of nations as
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 169 (D. Mass. 1995) (suit against former Guatema-
lan Minister of Defense for arbitrary detention, summary executions, and tor-
ture); See also Xiaoning v. Yahoo, Inc., No. C 07-2151 CW, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 97566 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2007) (case involving political dissent in
China); Br. for Appellants at 19, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d
254 (2d. Cir. 2007) (No. 03 Civ. 4624) (describing bases for ATS liability as
aiding and abetting “apartheid; genocide; extrajudicial killing; official torture
and other cruel, and inhuman, or degrading treatment, including sexual as-
sault; and prolonged arbitrary detention.”).
21. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide art. I, preamble, Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (setting forth a duty
to prevent and punish the crime of genocide); Convention Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) art.
146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (stating that parties must search for an
exercise jurisdiction “before [their] own courts” over persons who have commit-
ted war crimes “regardless of their nationality”); GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS ON
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: LATIN-AMERICA REGION 2005-2007, at 3
(2008), http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/R2P%20Govern-
ment%20statements%20Latin%20America%202005-2007.pdf (stating that
members of the United Nations have a duty to prevent war crimes). In Europe,
all 27 member states of the European Union as of 2012, as well as three other
members of the Council of Europe, are obligated by treaty to enforce judgments
issued by the 10 European States that exercise jurisdiction over “exceptional”
lawsuits where a victim has no other available remedy and there is a nexus
with the forum State. Br. for The European Commission on Behalf of the Eu-
ropean Union as Amicus Curiae Supp. Neither Party at 24–25, Kiobel, 133 S.
Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491), http://www.sdshhlaw.com/pdfs/European%20Commis-
sion%20on%20Behalf%20of%20the%20European%20Union%20(Revised).pdf.
It appears that the major European States— Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom—permit civil compensation
to be awarded in cases involving mass atrocities (these may need to be filed as
criminal cases in France, Germany, or the Netherlands). See id. at 25 (citing
Cour d’Assises [Cour. ass.] [Court of Assizes] Brussels, July 5, 2007, The Case
of the Major (Belg.); Rechtbank’s Gravenhage, 21 maart 2012, No.400882/HA
ZA 11-2252 (El-Hojouj/Derbal et al.) (Neth.); Br. for Juan E. Mendez, U.N. Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Torture as Amicus Curiae Supp. Pet’rs at 30–31, 34–35,
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491), http://harvardhumanrights.files.word-
press.com/2012/06/juan-e-mendez.pdf (citing Kovac v. Karadžic, Tribunal de
Grande Instance de Paris, Judgment of March 14, 2011 (Fr.); CODE DE
PROCÉDURE PÉNAL [C. PR. PÉN.] [Criminal Procedure Code] Arts. 3, 689-1 &
689-2 (Fr.); STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [Penal CODE], Nov. 13, 1998,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBl. I] 3322, as amended, § 6 (Ger.);
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rules, enforceable under federal common law and the ATS, that
limit executive power so as to promote peace.
This Article contains four principal parts. Part I describes the
vision of early American leaders that a robust ATS would safe-
guard victims of transnational dangers. Part II argues that the
key purpose of the ATS was to promote peace by offering an al-
ternative to sovereign retaliation. Part III analyzes how the
Bush and Obama administrations thwarted the promise of the
ATS in five ways: advocating reduced extraterritorial applica-
tion, opposing non-state actors’ accountability under the ATS,
pleading for deference to sovereign immunity in mass atrocity
cases, undermining the law of nations as being ineffective (non-
self-executing) verbiage, and invoking discretionary doctrines
that destroy federal court jurisdiction over “political questions.”
These five strategies culminated in a trio of cases ending with
Kiobel.22 Part IV surveys promising recent developments that
might lead to the International Criminal Court (ICC) filling the
gap left by Kiobel, and promoting peace by providing a forum for
the peaceful resolution of grievances. This Part explores how the
ICC could fund local reconciliation under Article 75 of its stat-
ute.23
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7, 1987,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBl. I] 1074, 1319, as amended, §§ 403-406
(Ger.); Dutch Civil Law, art. 9(c) (Neth.); LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CRIMINAL
[L.E. CRIM.] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Art. 100 (Spain)); REDRESS & INT’L
FED’N OF HUMAN RIGHTS (FIDH), LEGAL REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS OF
“INTERNATIONAL CRIMES” – FOSTERING AN EU APPROACH TO EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION 73 (2004), http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Le-
galRemediesFinal.pdf; Br. for The American Jewish Congress as Amici Curiae
Supp. Pet’r at 7–8, 32, 39, 41, Samantar v. Yousef, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08-
1555), http://www.oyez.org/sites/default/files/cases/briefs/pdf/brief__08-
1555__1.pdf (Italian High Court concluded that jus cogens violations—such as
genocide or torture—give rise to international jurisdiction because such viola-
tions may not be waived or overridden by contrary national laws) (citing Fer-
rini v. Federal Republic of Germany [Ferrini v. Republica Federale di Germa-
nia], Corte di Cassazione(Cass.), Joint Sections, Judgement 11 Mar. 2004, n.
5044 (It.)).
22. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1659 (2012); Republic
of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692 (2004).
23. See Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court art. 75(1), July 17, 1998,
37 I.L.M. 1002, 1003 [hereinafter “Rome Statute”] (“The Court shall establish
principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including resti-
tution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, the Court may . . . de-
termine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect
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I. LEGAL RESPONSES TO TRANSNATIONALDANGERS IN THE
VISION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS
A. The Quest for Original Understandings
The search for the original understanding of constitutions,
treaties, and statutes is an important task.24 Originalism helps
preserve the rule of law. It aims to block judges from introducing
of, victims.”); CARRIEMCDOUGALL, THECRIME OFAGGRESSIONUNDER THEROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 299 (2013) (“The Court can
make orders directly against convicted persons in respect of reparations or can
order that the award of reparations be made through the Trust Fund for Vic-
tims, provided for in Article 79(1) (Article 75(2)).”); id. (Court may decree col-
lective reparations). See also ICC, ICC - Reparation for Victims (2014),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/vic-
tims/reparation/Pages/reparation%20for%20victims.aspx (“For the first time,
an international criminal court has the power to order a criminal perpetrator
to pay reparation to a victim. . . . [Reparation] for victims . . . may include
restitution, indemnification and rehabilitation.”).
24. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714–25 (exploring history of ATS as guide to
intent of its drafters, which controlled its legal effect in a pending case); Khu-
lumani, 504 F.3d at 285–91 (Hall, J., concurring in part) (emphasizing original
understanding of ATS in order to determine scope of civil liability for genocide
and other international crimes); id. at 272–281 (Katzman, J., concurring in
part) (similar); id. at 311–26 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (similar); Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasizing early un-
derstanding of ATS); Jack Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of His-
tory, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 643, 718 (2013) (“Adoption history, and arguments
from ethos, tradition, and honored authority are among those tools [of argu-
ment and persuasion available to lawyers]; indeed, in American legal culture,
they are often quite powerful tools.”); William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins
of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS INT’L&
COMP. L. REV. 221, 225, 232 (1995-1996) (suggesting that ATS begs the ques-
tions of what “law of nations” was, how a “tort” might violate it, and whether
federal common law included crimes in violation of law of nations); Melvyn R.
Durchslag, The Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers: Is There Less Here
Than Meets the Eye?, 14 WM. &MARY BILLRTS. J. 243, 295, 297 (2005) (noting
that U.S. Supreme Court increasingly cites The Federalist in search of original
understandings); Ira C. Lupu, Time, the Supreme Court, and The Federalist,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1324, 1328 (1998) (rate of Supreme Court’s use of The
Federalist to decide cases has risen since 1980); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863–64 (1989) (suggesting that search
for original understandings helps mitigate the “danger in judicial interpreta-
tion of the Constitution . . . that the judges will mistake their own predilections
for the law”).
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ad hoc exceptions, additions, or other amendments to the Con-
stitution, the Bill of Rights, treaties, or statutes.25
Numerous false claims are circulating about the original un-
derstanding of the law of nations, including the claims that the
law of nations or the ATS had no applicability to civilians on
land, that it did not provide a cause of action, and that the law
of nations required additional enabling legislation on a case-by-
case basis.26 It is necessary to excavate these implicit or explicit
assumptions, highlight their importance in adjudication, and in-
terrogate their veracity and normative implications.
Implicit in the concept of an independent judiciary is the aim
that the courts of justice will be the guardians of the Constitu-
tion and statutes, charged with resisting attempts by the Presi-
dent and Congress to destroy them.27 The opposite of the original
understanding of a provision is often the crafting of ad hoc ex-
ceptions or additions to it,28 typically “influenced by factors that
judges ought not consider, such as the ideology of the [litigant]
or the perceived merits of the political movement to which he
belongs.”29 On many occasions, the Supreme Court has restored
25. Cf. Scalia, supra note 24, at 863–64. See also Heidi M. Hurd, Interpreta-
tion without Intentions, in REASONS AND INTENTIONS IN LAW AND PRACTICAL
AGENCY 52 (George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco eds., 2015) (“Some
originalists . . . [argue]: law is not law at all if those who are charged with its
application can alter its scope or meaning.”); id. (“Other originalists take the
bonds between originalism and the rule of law to be of a moral sort: the values
that lie behind the rule of law – liberty, fairness, and equality – are best pro-
tected by interpreting laws in a manner that does not permit their meaning to
change with time.”). The Author would amend Hurd’s description to emphasize
or add the clarification that it is most important in preserving the rule of law
that the implementation of law does not vary with the national, racial, ethnic,
religious, gender, or sexual orientation-related identity of the accused in a
criminal case, the parties in a civil case, or the adjudicator in any case.
26. See Dodge, supra note 24, at 237, 243.
27. Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143 (1959) (Black, J., dis-
senting) (noting that when a provision is “incorporated into the Constitution,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner
the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against
every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive.”) (emphasis in orig-
inal) (quoting 1 ANNALS OFCONG. 457 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
28. Cf. id. (“[The majority of the Court believes that] neither the First
Amendment nor any other provision of the Bill of Rights should be enforced
unless the Court believes it is reasonable to do so. . . . [T]his violate[s] the ge-
nius of our written Constitution.”) (emphasis in original).
29. Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1137
(2005). The Author would revise Volokh’s expression by adding the identity of
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the original understanding of a constitutional article or statute
against efforts by the executive or legislative branches to evade
its intended effect.30
In 1790-1791, James Madison and other members of Congress
believed that in “controverted cases, the meaning of the parties
to the instrument, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a
proper guide.”31 Madison emphasized that: “Contemporary and
concurrent expositions are a reasonable evidence of the meaning
of the parties.”32 Members of Congress looked, in interpreting
the Constitution, to what the drafters of its articles and amend-
ments had proposed and debated.33 Similarly, judges regarded
the intentions of the parties to an instrument other than a con-
stitution, like a treaty, as an authoritative guide to its mean-
ing.34
the litigant or the judge as a factor that ought not to be considered, but that is
often critical.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 238 (2005) (rejecting
longstanding practice of Congress and executive branch to base sentencing of
criminal defendants on factors that were not found by a jury, in violation of
original understanding of Sixth Amendment); Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (rejecting recent practice of federal and state prosecutors to
deny criminal defendants the right to cross-examine witnesses that original
understanding of Sixth Amendment would guarantee); Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353 (1998) (rejecting practice that had
emerged in twentieth century, due to various acts of Congress, which allowed
money damages to be imposed on a defendant without a right of trial by jury).
31. James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb.
2, 1791), (transcript available at http://www.constitu-
tion.org/jm/17910202_bank.htm) (quoted in Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Original Intent
in the First Congress, 71 MO. L. REV. 687, 690 (2006)).
32. Id.
33. See id.; see also Sirico, supra note 31, at 711–12; see also Richard S. Ar-
nold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267
(1997). As Congressman Elbridge Gerry stated, “the fairest and most rational
method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at
the time when the law was made, by signs the most probable, and these signs
are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effect and conse-
quences, or the spirit and reason of the law.’” II ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF
THEUNITED STATES 1732 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
34. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 239 (1796) (“The intention of the
framers of the treaty, must be collected from a view of the whole instrument,
and from the words made use of by them to express their intention, or from
probable or rational conjectures.”) (emphasis in original); The Brutus, 4 F. CAS.
490, 494 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 2,060) (“To construe the language [of an
agreement] by the technical rules of literal interpretation would be to defeat
the manifest intention of the parties.”); WILLIAMW. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE
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B. The Original Understanding of the Judicial Power over the
Law of Nations
The American founders intended to preserve the honor of the
United States, the sovereign power of the judiciary, and the pro-
tections of the law of nations.35 “By providing for an impartial
system of federal courts that had jurisdiction over [aliens’] con-
troversies, the new Government could shun political entangle-
ments and no-win situations.”36 The Constitution provides for a
“judicial power” to govern “Controversies” between foreign
States, citizens, or subjects and citizens of the States making up
the United States.37 It also extends the judicial power to contro-
versies arising under federal law, which has long been under-
stood to include the law of nations.38 Courts have held that even
controversies, such as torts, that “arise[] beyond the seas,” may
be brought where the parties happened to be found.39 Prior to
the Constitution, the Continental Congress called upon the
States to “authorise suits . . . for damages by the party injured .
. . by a citizen” of the United States in violation of the “law of
LAWOFCONTRACTSNOTUNDER SEAL 149 (photo. reprint 1972) (1844) (“[W]hen-
ever such intent [of the parties to a contract] can be distinctly ascertained, it
will prevail, not only in cases where it is not fully and clearly expressed, but
also, even where it contradicts the actual terms of the agreement.”); see also
Bache v. Proctor, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 247, (K.B.) 247; Lessee of Thomson v.
White, 1 Dall. 424, 426–27 (Pa. 1789); Ross v. Norvell, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 14, 16–
18 (Va. 1791); Kevin M. Teeven, A History of Legislative Reform of the Common
Law of Contract, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 35, 57–58 (1994).
35. See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of
1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 464, 475, 481–87 (1989).
36. Anthony D’Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Con-
stitution, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 66 (1988).
37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
38. See id.; Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1972); Louis
Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555,
1557 (1984).
39. See McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 241, 248 (1843) (“[I]f A becomes
indebted to B, or commits a tort upon his person or upon his personal property
in Paris, an action in either case may be maintained against A in England, if
he is there found . . . . [A]s to transitory actions, there is not a colour of doubt
but that any action which is transitory may be laid in any county in England,
though the matter arises beyond the seas.”) (quoting Mostyn v. Fabrigas,
(1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.) 1030–31, 1032, 1 Cowp. 161, 177–79, 181 (Lord
of Mansfield, C.J.)); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
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nations.”40 Failing to permit such suits might lead to war.41 For
these reasons, the ATS remedies international assaults in order
to avoid entangling the United States in further wars and dis-
honorable acts.42
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established federal jurisdiction over
“all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the
matter in dispute exceeds . . . five hundred dollars, and . . . an
alien is a party,” and over “all causes where an alien sues for a
tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”43 By a “tort only” Congress probably meant civil
controversies arising out of common-law crimes in violation of
40. Dodge, supra note 24, at 227 (quoting 21 JOURNALS OF CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 1136−37 (1912)).
41. See Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 881, 889, 903 (2006).
42. Cf. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (July 4, 1776) (suggesting that just rule and unalienable rights were
violated by King of Great Britain’s “repeated injuries and usurpations, all hav-
ing in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these
states”); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 266 (James Madison)(E.H. Scott ed., 1984)
(“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-ap-
pointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
43. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1
STAT. 73, 75–78 (1789).
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the laws of nations.44 Those crimes were initially piracy, assault-
ing an ambassador, and assaulting other friendly civilians.45 A
letter to James Madison in 1789 identified “torts” as being dif-
ferent from contracts and debts, and as involving “wrongs.”46 Yet
the Judiciary Act’s language conferring jurisdiction over “alien”
suits went well beyond ambassadors, whose suits were expressly
44. See Br. of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History as Amici
Curiae Supp. Resp’s at 110, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 372 (2004),
(Nos. 03-339, 03-485), reprinted in 28 HASTINGS INT’L& COMP. L. REV. 99, 110
(2004) (word “tort” was used at the time for common-law crimes of assault and
trespass) (collecting sources); id. at 112 n.12 (“[T]hroughout the 1790’s the
United States continued to bring criminal indictments at common law, partic-
ularly for violations of the law of nations.”); id. at 106–07 (founders intended
that “‘cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations ... may be supposed
proper for the federal jurisdiction.’”); id. at 108 (“‘The law of nations was con-
sidered at that time to be part of the general common law, which could be ap-
plied by courts in the absence of controlling positive law to the contrary.’”)
(quoting Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J.
INT’L L. 587, 595 (2002)); id. at 116–17 (“[T]he ATS . . . provided jurisdiction to
adjudicate disputes under a law that was already binding everywhere in the
world—the law of nations.”); Henkin, supra note 38, at 1557 (“[F]rom our na-
tional beginnings both state and federal courts have treated customary inter-
national law as incorporated and have applied it to cases before them without
express constitutional or legislative sanction.”); Robert C. Palmer, The Federal
Common Law of Crime, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 267, 276, 278 (1986) (arguing that
during the founding generation, “Federal jurisdiction over piracy and the law
of nations was the least contentious jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts.”);
see also Anthony D’Amato, Judge Bork’s Concept of the Law of Nations Is Seri-
ously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 92 (1985); D’Amato, The Alien Tort Statute,
supra note 36, at 66; Dodge, supra note 24, at 232.
45. See Lee, supra note 41, at 882, 845–46, 890 n.304 (“there can be no
doubt” that “individuals” injured by “acts of hostility” overseas have a “tort”
action under ATS) (citing Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 58 (1795),
and 4 WILLIAMBLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 68; 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (1795));
Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132
S. Ct. 1659 (2012) (No. 10-1491), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_argu-
ments/argument_transcripts/10-1491rearg.pdf (“[I]t’s absolutely clear that
what the British were concerned about was pillaging and plundering on land
in the Sierra Leone colony. They were seeking redress for those things, for de-
stroying libraries, for destroying Freetown, not just about things that hap-
pened on the high seas and not just about things that happened in territorial
waters. It’s absolutely clear that that’s true, but . . . Attorney General Bradford
said there was no doubt that there was an ATS action.”).
46. Id. at 897 (quoting Letter from Edmund Pendelton to James Madison
(July 3, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARYHISTORY OF THE SUPREMECOURT, 1789-1800,
at 444, 446 (Maeva Marcus eds., 1992)).
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covered by a separate section of the Act.47 Thus, Lee argues that
suits involving injuries to federal detainees and victims of over-
seas military operations fall squarely within the grant of juris-
diction over “a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty.”48 The grant implemented the law of nations in cases in-
volving less than $500, carrying out Article III’s intent to commit
the “laws of nations” to the “judgment of courts.”49
Historically, the drafters of ATS aspired to prevent “the risk of
war” or a situation in which “serious blame [would] fall on the
United States,” by remedying the effects of unlawful private acts
such as assaults on ambassadors, piracy, and actions of the “en-
tire nation” in violating the security of foreign subjects.50 Sover-
eign immunity did not apply to such private acts.51
The claim by the Bush and Obama administrations of a right
to evade the law by means of Statements of Interest is an assault
on the rule of law. Article III, as designed by the founders of the
U.S. Constitution, provides no room for such a claim. The Con-
stitution contains no express protection of the President from
civil litigation. Sovereign immunity does not apply to many offi-
cial acts in violation of constitutional rights or statutory pro-
scriptions.52 For this reason, until the 1990s, sitting presidents
47. See id. at 860, 862. The Constitution also distinguished between ambas-
sadors and mere foreign subjects, and grants more expansive Article III juris-
diction in cases involving the former. See id. at 853.
48. Id. at 901–03.
49. THE FEDERALIST No 3, at 41, 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See also THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 475–76 (Alexander Hamilton).
50. Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Authority, 642 F.3d 1088, 1098−1100 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (Williams, J., concurring), http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opin-
ions.nsf/82785E4C0AAF10D6852578AF004FA420/$file/10-7024-1313044.pdf.
51. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (cit-
ing In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988)).
52. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 774 (1982) (White, J., dissenting)
(“‘[The President] is placed high, and is possessed of power far from being con-
temptible; yet not a single privilege is annexed to his character; far from being
above the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character as a citizen,
and in his public character by impeachment.’”) (quoting statement of Governor
Wilson at Pennsylvania ratifying convention, in 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 480 (1876 ed.)); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 490
(1978) (“For example, Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804), held the com-
mander of an American warship liable in damages for the seizure of a Danish
cargo ship on the high seas. . . . The Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall, held that the President’s instructions could not ‘legalize an act
which, without those instructions, would have been a plain trespass.’”) (quot-
ing Little, 2 Cranch at 179); see alsoUnited States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706–
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had to answer to the judicial branch for documents or testimony
in their possession or in the possession of their underlings, even
if the evidence related to official acts.53 The possibility that pend-
ing litigation would offend the President’s foreign allies or dis-
tract the President from his or her political responsibilities, so
often viewed as dispositive today, was originally no basis for
abandoning the rule of law.54
The proper response to Statements of Interest seeking exemp-
tions from constitutional, treaty-based, or statutory law is to de-
clare that sovereign immunity ends when unlawful, ultra vires
acts are committed.55 Thus, private plaintiffs could sue soldiers
707 (1974) (“[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an ab-
solute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process un-
der all circumstances. . . . [Such a privilege] would plainly conflict with the
function of the courts under Art. III.”).
53. See Jones v. Clinton, 520 U.S. 681, 704 (1997) (“Sitting Presidents have
responded to court orders to provide testimony and other information with suf-
ficient frequency that such interactions between the Judicial and Executive
Branches can scarcely be thought a novelty.”).
54. See id. at 717 (Breyer, J., concurring) (Supreme Court precedent sug-
gests that “the Constitution does not offer a sitting President significant pro-
tections from potentially distracting civil litigation.”); Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at
774 (White, J., dissenting) (“‘If an officer [of the United States] commits an
offence against an individual, he is amenable to the courts of law. If he commits
crimes against the state, he may be indicted and punished. Impeachment only
extends to high crimes and misdemeanors in a public office.’”) (quoting state-
ment of Governor Randolph at North Carolina ratifying convention, 4 ELLIOT,
supra note 52, at 48); Butz, 438 U.S. at 489 (immunity from suit does not apply
to federal officer who “ignored an express statutory or constitutional limitation
on his authority.”).
55. See, e.g., Butz, 438 U.S. at 490−91 (“Since an unconstitutional act, even
if authorized by statute, was viewed as not authorized in contemplation of law,
there could be no immunity defense.”) (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196, 218-223 (1882); Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 285−92 (1885)); id.
at 520 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (under majority
opinion, “an official has immunity until someone alleges he has acted uncon-
stitutionally. But that is no immunity at all: The ‘immunity’ disappears at the
very moment when it is needed.”); see also Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706−07 (“[N]ei-
ther the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of
high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified
Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circum-
stances . . . . [Such a privilege] would plainly conflict with the function of the
courts under Art. III.”).
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or naval officers for “wartime injuries.”56 Blackstone’s maxim
that “the king can do no wrong” finds no echo in the U.S. Consti-
tution.57 In one famous case, a Japanese general was held to ac-
count for mass atrocities, and the Supreme Court exercised fed-
eral question jurisdiction over issues of the laws of war and Fifth
Amendment due process.58 A contrary rule threatens to destroy
the Constitution and the rule of law by barring access to the
courts for vindication of rights precisely in those cases in which
the intervention of the courts is most needed.59
56. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 700,
711 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“[Historically,] private plaintiffs were allowed to bring tort
actions for wartime injuries. SeeMitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115, (1851) (sol-
dier sued for trespass for wrongfully seizing a citizen’s goods while in Mexico
during the Mexican War); Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 24 L.Ed. 1018 (1878)
(soldier was not exempt from civil liability for trespass and destruction of cattle
if his act was not done in accordance with the usages of civilized warfare)….”),
rev’d, 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir.
2012) (en banc); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804) (naval officer liable to ship
owner for damages for illegal seizure of his vessel during wartime).
57. See Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 342–43 (1882).
58. Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); see also United States v. Yama-
shita, in 4 UNITED NATIONSWAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1948); Anthony D’Amato, The Imposition of Attorney
Sanctions for Claims Arising from the U.S. Air Raid on Libya, 84 AM. J. INT’L
L. 705, 708–09 (1990).
59. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
395, 397 (1971) (victim of unlawful search could sue federal agents for damages
because “‘[the] very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws,’” and “[historically,] dam-
ages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal
interests in liberty”) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)); In
re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“The
Executive and others are clearly bound by the laws of war as well as other
types of international law.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing U.S. Const., art. II, § 3); Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
Filartiga, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 603 (1984) (“Because foreign officials are
among the prospective defendants in suits alleging violations of fundamental
human rights, such suits unquestionably implicate foreign policy considera-
tions. But . . . the protection of fundamental human rights is not committed
exclusively to the political branches of government.”) (citing Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423, 430 n. 34 (1964)). Cf. also Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5, 11 (1973) (suit for damages against Ohio National
Guard for shooting student protesters might be appropriate); Ford v. United
States, 273 U.S. 593, 606 (1927) (if “federal officers” conspired with private
persons in a crime, then all parties involved would be guilty of conspiring to
violate U.S. statute and treaty, “whether they are in or out of the country”);
Expert Op. of Prof. Jordan Paust, In re Agent Orange, 2005 WL 6041235 (Jan.
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C. The Development of Institutions for Responding to Transna-
tional Dangers
Between 1933 and 1945, Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term
“genocide,” developed an influential theory of transnational dan-
gers, including genocide. In 1933, he proposed at an interna-
tional conference to criminalize “transnational dangers,” which
he defined as barbarous attacks on the lives or cultures of ethnic,
national, or religious groups.60 In 1945, he coined the term “gen-
ocide” for “destroying institutions” of “captive” or colonized peo-
ples, such as by taking over their governments, seizing their
businesses, burning their places of worship, or by the “mass
killing” of them either immediately or over time by starvation or
poverty.61 The concept proved useful to the Nuremberg Tribunal
in 1945, the United Nations General Assembly in 1946, and the
signatories to the Genocide Convention in 1948 and down to to-
day.62
Since 1945, the United Nations has proliferated institutions
for responding to mass atrocities, including the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), U.N. Security Council, the U.N. General
Assembly, the office of the U.N. Secretary-General, the ICC, the
ad hoc U.N. international criminal tribunals, U.N. supported hy-
brid domestic-international criminal tribunals, and a variety of
special advisers, special rapporteurs, and investigators of mass
5, 2005) (suit for damages against United States for violations of law during
Vietnam War would be appropriate under Articles II and III of Constitution).
But cf. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 755−56 (“In view of the special nature of the
President's constitutional office and functions, we think it appropriate to rec-
ognize absolute Presidential immunity from damages liability for acts within
the ‘outer perimeter’ of his official responsibility.”); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564 (1959) (recognizing federal official’s absolute privilege in civil defamation
cases) (citing Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896)).
60. Raphael Lemkin, Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger
Considered as Offences Against the Law of Nations, PREVENT GENOCIDE,
http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/madridl933-english.htm (last updated
Dec. 9, 2000).
61. RAPHAELLEMKIN, AXISRULE INOCCUPIEDEUROPE: LAWS OFOCCUPATION,
ANALYSIS OFGOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FORREDRESS, at ix (1944).
62. Raphael Lemkin, Genocide—A Modern Crime, 4 FREEWORLD 39 (1945),
available at www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/freeworld1945.htm; Eugene
Taylor & Abraham Krikorian, Educating the Public and Mustering Support for
the Ratification of the Genocide Convention: Transcript of United Nations Case-
book Chapter XXI: Genocide, a 13 February 1949 Television Broadcast Hosted
by Quincy Howe with Raphael Lemkin, Emanuel Celler and Ivan Kerno, in 5
WARCRIMES, GENOCIDE&CRIMES AGAINSTHUMANITY 91, 111–12 (2011).
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atrocities. In 1993, for example, the ICJ ordered Yugoslavia to
desist from aiding perpetrators of the crime of genocide in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina,63 and the Security Council established the
ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via (ICTY), to be followed by the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda (ICTR).64 In 1998, the ICTR issued the first gen-
ocide conviction since World War II against an official responsi-
ble for massacres of the Tutsi in Rwanda,65 and, responding to
Secretary-General Annan’s request for a report on the situation
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), an investigative
team concluded that “the systematic massacre of the [surviving]
Hutus,” after the Rwandan Patriotic Army invaded the DRC, re-
vealed “the intent to eliminate the Rwandan Hutus remaining
in the country.”66 The Rome Statute of the International Court,
ratified by more than 100 states by 2007, entered into force in
2002 with a promise to end impunity for transnational crimes
such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.67
These institutions carried their work forward in the years
since 2000, repeatedly condemning mass atrocities such as eth-
nic cleansing and localized massacres. In 2001, the ICTY issued
a verdict against a Bosnian Serb general for complicity in geno-
cide, based on the “accounts given by the survivors of [] execution
sites,” and forensic evidence suggesting a minimum of 2,000 sep-
arate bodies buried in mass graves in the Srebrenica region of
63. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13), avail-
able at http://www.worldcourts.com/icj/eng/decisions/1993.09.13_geno-
cide_convention.htm.
64. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, paras. 1–4 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf; M. Cherif Bassio-
uni, From Versailles to Rwanda in 75 Years: The Need to Establish a Perma-
nent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 11–12, 42–49
(1997).
65. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judg-
ment, paras. 523–24 (Sept. 2, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/ictr/eng-
lish/judgements/akayesu.html.
66. Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team Charged with In-
vestigating Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitar-
ian Law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, paras 4, 95–96 U.N. Doc. No.
S/1998/581 (June 29, 1998), quoted in WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OFCRIMES 478 (1st ed. 2000).
67. DAVIDWEISSBRODT&CONNIEDE LAVEGA, INTERNATIONALHUMANRIGHTS
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 228–30, 238 (2007).
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Bosnia and Herzegovina.68 Also in that year, the prosecutor in-
dicted the commander of the Croatian defense forces for perpe-
trating crimes against humanity affecting Croatian Serbs, in-
cluding murder, deportations, cruelties, and racial, religious, or
political persecutions, as well as the war crimes of wanton de-
struction of cities, plunder, and murder.69 The indictment de-
scribed “killing, arson, looting, harassment, terror and threats
of physical harm” of the Croatian Serb minority, which caused
“a large-scale deportation and/or displacement of an estimated
150,000 - 200,000 Krajina Serbs to Bosnia Herzegovina and Ser-
bia.”70 In 2004, the U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, an-
nounced that massive war crimes had been perpetrated in the
Darfur region of Sudan.71 The next year, an Independent Com-
mission of Inquiry on Darfur commissioned by the Security
Council found that Arab militias had been massacring non-Ar-
abs since the 1980s, with the militias’ men expressing a goal to
exterminate or subjugate the “blacks” [Nuba or Zurga] or
“slaves” [abid], which goal was carried out in Darfur through a
“pattern of indiscriminate attacks on civilians in villages and
communities” including the “systematic killing of civilians be-
longing to particular tribes.”72 While in 1994 there was an at-
mosphere of impunity for violations of international law, by 2009
Mendez argued that there had been prosecutions in domestic or
international tribunals with respect to crimes in Bosnia, East
Timor, Kosovo, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Argentina, Co-
lombia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, and Peru.73
68. Prosecutor v. Krstic, supra note 64, paras. 4, 73–75, 81.
69. See id.; Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-01-45-I, Indictment, paras.
1–20 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2001), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina_old/ind/en/got-ii010608e.htm.
70. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, supra note 69, para. 20.
71. Editorial, Darfur, N.Y. SUN, July 21, 2004, http://www.nysun.com/edi-
torials/darfur/78477/. (“Based on reports that I have received, I can’t at this
stage call it genocide. There are massive violations of international humani-
tarian law, but I am not ready to describe it as genocide or ethnic cleansing
yet.” (quoting Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General)).
72. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the
United Nations Secretary-General: Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1564 of 18 September 2004, paras. 126–27, 184, 238, 254, 507, 511 & n.10 (Jan.
25, 2005), http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf.
73. See Juan Mendez, A History of Genocide, YOUTUBE (Jan. 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2wnPox-DXh0.
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Developments in 2006-2008 threatened to make hollow many
of the promises of the ICC and the United Nations to end impu-
nity. In 2006, the International Court of Justice found that it
lacked jurisdiction over an application filed by the DRC against
Rwanda for committing genocide by invading and plundering
the DRC, and then “killing, massacring, raping, throat-cutting,
and crucifying . . . more than 3,500,000 Congolese, including the
victims of the recent massacres in the city of Kisangani.”74 Fol-
lowing a guilty plea by the Rwandan prime minister a decade
earlier, in 2008 the ICTR convicted high-ranking military offic-
ers from Rwanda for culpability in massacres committed in Ki-
gali, the capital of Rwanda, as well as at other sites outside Ki-
gali, including places of worship.75 At the same time, in a blow
for the Tutsi victims of the Rwandan military, the ICTR rejected
significant evidence of a military role in the conspiracy to com-
mit genocide against the Tutsi in 1994.76 The ICC’s Pre-Trial
Chamber I echoed this conclusion in rejecting genocide charges
against President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, despite the findings
of the international inquiry in 2005.77 In 2010, the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights announced the results of
an investigation of the massacres in the DRC, which concluded
that Rwandan president Paul Kagame had been the architect of
a plan formulated in 1996 or 1997 to “destroy the [Hutu] refugee
camps” in the DRC; this plan caused 3.8 million people to perish
74. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 32, para. 67 (Feb. 3).
75. See Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement
and Sentence, Trial Chamber I, para. 2158 (Dec. 18, 2008). Although the head
of the operations bureau of the army general staff was acquitted of the crime
of genocide, the head of what was apparently the provisional military govern-
ment of Rwanda, the commander of the Gisenyi operational sector, and the
commander of the elite Para Commando Battalion were convicted of genocide.
See id., paras. 1, 16, 2158–61, 2258.
76. EDWARD HERMAN & DAVID PETERSON, THE POLITICS OF GENOCIDE 54–55
(2011).
77. See id. at 104–05. The Appeals Chamber of the ICC reversed this deci-
sion on a blended rationale of procedural and substantive grounds. See Hanni-
bal Travis, On the Original Understanding of the Crime of Genocide, 7
GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION: AN INT’L J. 30, 38 (2012), available at
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol7/iss1/6.
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of war-related causes by 2004.78 Kagame created militias and re-
bel armies who answered to the Rwandan military.79 This group
massacred refugees in the DRC.80 Yet, by 2013, Kagame had not
been held accountable for massacres in the DRC, despite the
findings of the investigation.81
II. THE TREND TOWARD IMPUNITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW SINCE 2001
A. The Trends toward Impunity and Non-Transparency
Despite promises that the ICCwould bring an end to impunity,
the results have been disappointing. No one was convicted of an-
ything by the ICC for more than eight years.82 A number of Afri-
78. OFFICE OF THEU.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FORHUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OF
THE MAPPING EXERCISE DOCUMENTING THE MOST SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF
HUMANRIGHTS AND INTERNATIONALHUMANITARIANLAWCOMMITTEDWITHIN THE
TERRITORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO BETWEENMARCH 1993
AND JUNE 2003, at 257, 323 (Aug. 2010), http://www.genocidewatch.org/im-
ages/DRC10_06_xx_Report_Draft_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_1993-
2003.pdf.
79. Id. at 257.
80. Id. at 77.
81. See Kambale Musavuli, Syria, the DRC and the ‘Responsibility to Pro-
tect’: The U.S. Double Standard, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kambale-musavuli/syria-the-drc-and-the-
res_b_4248673.html?utm_hp_ref=paul-kagame.
82. See Joshua Rozenberg, ICC Prosecutors Should Not Be Grandstanding
on Their Own Cases, GUARDIAN (U.K.), (Aug. 18, 2010, 8:29 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/aug/18/luis-moreno-ocampo-omar-bashir
(no convictions or completed trials in eight years of operations); see also Jelena
Pia-Comella, Talking Points for Panel Presentation, Prosecuting Gender-based
Crimes at the ICC, at 3 (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CSW-
panelMarch62013.pdf (although International Criminal Court looked into
grave crimes in eight countries, and brought thirteen charges for gender-based
crimes, for example, “half of the sexual violence counts sought by the Prosecu-
tion do not make it to the trial stage mainly due to the poor quality of evidence
and insufficient evidence”); Did You Know . . . Egypt, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Jan 28, 2013), http://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/spot-
light/did-you-knowegypt (no convictions for Maspero massacre of twenty-six
people, mostly Copts, in Cairo); Michael Wahid Hanna, Egypt and the Struggle
for Accountability and Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE ARAB SPRING
175–77, 183 (Kirsten J. Fisher & Robert Stewart eds., 2014) (“impunity” for
“military” action against “predominantly-Christian” protesters at Maspero
site, although there were convictions of Ministry of the Interior officials for
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can nations decided to ignore the ICC’s arrest warrant for geno-
cide in Sudan.83 The ICC dismissed the case of Iraq as minor,
despite 1.8 million deaths since 1990.84 Despite dozens of mas-
sacres in Iraq and elsewhere, constituting probable crimes
against humanity,85 the ICC began with the arguably less grave
crime of using child soldiers.86
criminal negligence in deaths of seventy soccer “fans” and five other security
officials for death of a “Salafi” leader).
83. See RICHARD GOLDSTONE, ENSURING COOPERATION WITH THE ICC 55
(2013), http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/1/wp-content/up-
loads/2013/05/Cooperation-with-the-ICC.pdf (although “Sudanese President
Bashir is subject to an arrest warrant in respect of alleged genocide, war crimes
and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur,” he “has visited Kenya,
Chad, Malawi and Djibouti (sometimes repeatedly), all of which have ratified
the Rome Statute. . . . The inability of the ICC to enforce compliance with arrest
warrants is one of its biggest challenges.”).
84. See HERMAN&PETERSON, supra note 76, at 34–35, 38, 107–09.
85. In 2015, a Commission of Inquiry accused Islamic State forces in north-
ern Iraq of carrying out crimes against humanity and genocidal acts; a princi-
pal target was the Yezidi minority, although other groups were also subjected
to massacres and kidnappings of civilians including of women and children.
See, e.g., ICC Should Prosecute Islamic State for Iraq Genocide, War Crimes:
U.N., CENTRAL CHRONICLE (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.centralchroni-
cle.com/icc-should-prosecute-islamic-state-for-iraq-genocide-war-crimes-u-
n.html. See also 60 Minutes Season 47 Episode 26: Iraq's Christians, Rare
Earth Elements, Starstruck, YOUTUBE (Mar. 22, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O3-ij76hYO0; Daniel Costa-Roberts, 8
Things You Didn’t Know About Assyrian Christians, PBC ONLINE NEWSHOUR
RUNDOWN BLOG (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/8-
things-didnt-know-assyrian-christians/.
86. See HUMANRIGHTSREPORT: 1 JANUARY – 30 JUNE 2008,U.N. ASSISTANCE
MISSION FOR IRAQ (UNAMI), paras. 34–37, 43, 56 (2007),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Coun-
tries/IQ/UNAMI_Human_Rights_Report_January_June_2008_EN.pdf (de-
scribing daily attacks on civilians in Iraq by insurgents, and homicides by Iraqi
security forces, in early 2008); HUMANRIGHTSREPORT: 1 APRIL – 30 JUNE 2007,
UNAMI, paras. 1–2, 17, 40 (2007), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Coun-
tries/IQ/HRReportAprJun2007EN.pdf (describing daily attacks on civilians in
Iraq by insurgents, and homicides by Iraqi security forces, as of spring 2007);
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: 1 JANUARY – 31 MARCH 2007, UNAMI (2007),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/jan-to-march2007_engl.pdf (de-
scribing daily attacks on civilians in Iraq by insurgents, and homicides by Iraqi
security forces, in early 2007); UN-IRAQ HUMANITARIAN UPDATE, DECEMBER
2005 AND JANUARY 2006, UNAMI 2, http://reliefweb.int/sites/re-
liefweb.int/files/resources/740A3161AF02F10C85257131005DEFBC-unami-
irq-31jan.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2015) (describing daily attacks on civilians
in Iraq by insurgents, and homicides by Iraqi security forces, as of late 2005
2015] THE ICC AND KIOBEL 571
In the United States, the political elites have successfully re-
sisted the jurisdiction of the ICC for more than a decade. Acting
on behalf of the United States, President Bush’s Undersecretary
of State, John Bolton, announced the administration’s intention
not to pursue ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC in
2002.87 Issuing a signing statement shortly after 9/11, President
Bush suggested that he could withhold information from the
other branches of government under his power of supervising a
“unitary executive branch.”88 This invoked the unitary executive
and early 2006); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pur-
suant to Paragraph 30 of Resolution 1546, paras. 46, 66–67, U.N. Doc.
S/2006/945 (Dec. 5, 2006) (up to 600,000 Iraqi civilians perished in targeted
attacks against them, waged on a daily basis by militias and terrorists in a
climate of “prevailing impunity”); 2005 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices: Iraq, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Mar. 8, 2006),
www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61689.htm (torture, a crime against hu-
manity, “commonplace” in Iraq as early as 2005); 2008 Country Reports on Hu-
man Rights Practices: Iraq, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Feb. 25, 2009),
www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119116.htm (torture continued in Iraq
in 2008); William Schabas, Lubanga Sentenced to Fourteen Years, PHDSTUDIES
IN HUMAN RIGHTS (July 13, 2012), humanrightsdoctorate.blog-
spot.com/2012/07/lubanga-sentence-to-fourteen-years.html. Schabas ex-
pressed disappointment with the ICC after the first sentence issued from it,
stating: “The Lubanga sentence confirms the mythology of the International
Criminal Court, whereby prosecutions in situations that threaten major pow-
ers are avoided while relatively insignificant cases in soft African targets at-
tract the considerable resources of the institution.” Id. Professor Schabas at-
tended the drafting process of the Rome Statute of the ICC. See WILLIAM
SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIMES OFCRIMES 96 (1st ed.,
2000).
87. See Press Release, Amnesty International, U.S. Efforts to Obtain Impu-
nity for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes (Sept. 2, 2002),
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20060807041852/http://web.am-
nesty.org/library/index/engior400252002; Press Statement, Richard Boucher,
Spokesman, U.S. Dep’t of State, International Criminal Court: Letter to U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002),
http://www.state/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm; White House Office of Communi-
cations, Statement by President on Signature of the ICC Treaty (Jan. 2, 2001),
available at 2001 WL 6008.
88. Presidential Statement on Signing the Departments of Commerce, Jus-
tice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002,
37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1723, 1724 (Nov. 28, 2001). Similarly, President
Bush refused to commit to enforcing laws passed by Congress on several occa-
sions after 9/11, because he believed that the rule of law might infringe upon
his “constitutional authorities . . . to supervise the unitary executive branch
and to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign rela-
tions, the national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the
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theory of Ronald Reagan and his supporters, under which the
President wields U.S. sovereignty directly, in a way that renders
optional compliance with treaties, the Constitution’s require-
ment that the Congress declare a newwar, and the Fifth Amend-
ment’s due process guarantee.89 In 2005, President Bush’s dele-
gate to the United Nations insisted that while violators of inter-
national law should be “held accountable,” the ICC could not “ex-
ercise jurisdiction over the . . . government officials[] of States
not party to the Rome Statute.”90 Those States include Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, and the United States.
The Bush administration coupled opposition of the ICC with
dismissals of the illegality of aggressive war, and insistence that
there could be no further international human-rights cases in
the U.S. courts. In 2002, President Bush signed the authoriza-
tion for war with Iraq by using the expression that he “appreci-
ated” but did not need the resolution due to his unitary authority
to wage war to “deter” or “prevent” any “threats to U.S. inter-
ests.”91 The Bush administration and like-minded corporations
performance of the Executive’s constitutional duties.” Statement on Signing
the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 38
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1971 (Nov. 2, 2002), http://www.presi-
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73177.
89. See Br. for United States as Amicus Curiae, In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d
476 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87-5261, 87-5264, and 87-5265), rev’d sub nom. Mor-
rison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), reprinted in 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 101–
02 (1987) (executive branch should not be subject “in whole or in part to the
control and cooperation of other[branch]es.”) (quoting Hamilton, supra note
49); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Uni-
tary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 701–02
(2005) (“When the question arose whether to invade and liberate the tiny Car-
ibbean nation of Grenada [without a declaration of war or Security Council
resolution], Reagan tersely ordered his joint chief of staff, ‘Do it.’”); see also R.J.
Smith, Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memos; Most Scholars Reject Broad
View of Executive’s Power,WASH. POST, July 4, 2004, at A12; Peter Spiro,What
Happened to the “New Sovereigntism”?, FOREIGNAFFAIRS.ORG (July 28, 2004),
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040728faupdate83476/peter-j-spiro/what-hap-
pened-to-the-new-sovereigntism.html.
90. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in
Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Re-
lease SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm.
91. President George W. Bush, Presidential Statement on Signing the Au-
thorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, University of California
at Santa Barbara (Oct. 26, 2002), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/in-
dex.php?pid=64386.
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then began advocating that the Supreme Court ban interna-
tional human rights litigation.92 This theory of a “unitary” exec-
utive is contrary to the vision of the Founders, in which the ex-
ecutive cannot overrule the courts.93 Both Reagan and Bush
broke with a tradition of presidential compliance with the courts
by declining to comply with subpoenas, congressional and quasi-
congressional requests for documents and depositions.94 The ad-
ministration of President Barack Obama, in turn, is known as
92. Cf. Adam Liptak, U.S. Courts’ Role in Foreign Feuds Comes Under Fire,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003 at N1, N18. See also Supp. Br. for the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No.
10-1491), 2012 WL 3245482.
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (executive power should not have “overruling influence over the other[]
[powers], in the administration of their respective powers”). For example, in
Clinton v. Jones, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the proposition that
the president can evade civil or criminal claims on the grounds that “the doc-
trine of separation of powers places limits on the authority of the Federal Ju-
diciary to interfere with the Executive Branch that would be transgressed by
allowing [an] action to proceed.” 520 U.S. 681, 697–98 (1997). Although, as it
is often pointed out, Alexander Hamilton wrote that a “feeble Executive implies
a feeble execution of the government,” later in the same letter or article he
clarified that he was advocating a single President rather than a privy council
as in “England,” not an executive who decides matters of law or announces
rules of law in addition to executing the laws. Hamilton added that one ad-
vantage of a unitary executive is that it makes it easier to determine where the
“blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious
measures, ought really to fall,” implying that judicial punishment of the Pres-
ident is possible. THEFEDERALISTNo. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (emphasis added), http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa70.htm.
Hamilton also wanted a king and a house of lords instead of a democratic pres-
ident and senate. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to President GeorgeWash-
ington (Sept. 9, 1792), quoted in GEORGE TUCKER, THE LIFE OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, THIRDPRESIDENTOF THEUNITEDSTATES 438 (1837) (“[M]y objection
to the constitution was the want of a bill of rights—Colonel Hamilton’s, that it
wanted a king and house of lords.”). The republicans, or Jeffersonians, beat
back his monarchical instincts. See id. (“The sense of America has approved
my objection, and added the bill of rights, and not the king and lords.”). At the
urging of Jefferson, James Madison condemned Hamilton’s efforts to import
the “royal prerogative” power of Great Britain into the presidency as both “vi-
cious” and “dangerous.” James Madison, Helvidius, in 1 LETTERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMESMADISON 152 (J.B. Lippincot ed., 1865). See also Steven G.
Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-
Century, 47 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1458 (1997).
94. Compare, e.g., JOHN DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE: THE SECRET
PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2004),
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the least transparent in recent history due to noncooperation
with congressional committees and judicial matters in which ev-
idence from the executive branch is requested by the press, the
public, and litigants.95
http://books.google.com/books?id=zLx91XOMElQC&pg=PT75 (“The White
House took an unprecedented stance in refusing to permit either Don
Rumsfeld, as secretary of defense, or Colin Powell, as secretary of state, from
testifying about matters relating to pre-9/11 counterterrorism activities.”),
Dana Milbank, Barriers To 9/11 Inquiry Decried; Congress May Push Com-
mission, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2004, at A14 (describing creation of 9/11 Com-
mission after Bush White House refused to cooperate with bipartisan congres-
sional requests for information about what happened in months leading up to
attacks), and Joe Pichirallo and Ruth Marcus, Reagan, Bush Subpoenaed by
North: White House to Fight Testimony Demand,WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1988, at
A1, A12 (describing noncooperation of Reagan administration with criminal
inquiry into provision of arms to Nicaraguan rebels), with Clinton, 520 U.S. at
704–06 (“President Nixon . . . produced tapes in response to a subpoena duces
tecum, . . . President Ford complied with an order to give a deposition in a
criminal trial,. . . and President Clinton has twice given videotaped testimony
in criminal proceedings. Moreover, sitting Presidents have also voluntarily
complied with judicial requests for testimony. President Grant gave a lengthy
deposition in a criminal case under such circumstances, and President Carter
similarly gave videotaped testimony for use at a criminal trial.”) (citations
omitted) (citing United States v. McDougal, 934 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Ark. 1996);
United States v. Branscum, No. LRP-CR-96-49 (E.D. Ark., June 7, 1996);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); United States v. Fromme, 405 F.
Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1975); RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN E NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7.1 (2d ed. 1992)).
95. See Letter from the Association of American Law Libraries et al., to
President Obama concerning a Security Classification Reform Steering Com-
mittee (Apr. 23, 2013), available at http://www.pogo.org/our-work/let-
ters/2013/20130423-pogo-and-allies-urge-obama-classification-reform.html
(arguing that public is unnecessarily denied foreign-affairs information be-
cause “classification activity has been dramatically on the rise for many years,
with over 92 million decisions to classify information in fiscal year 2011
alone”); Ted Cruz, Benghazi Eight Months Later, NATIONAL REVIEW (May 8,
2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/347683/benghazi-eight-months-
later (Congress could not get information from administration about what hap-
pened during attack on Sept. 12, 2012, why requested security was denied, how
administration responded, why it edited talking points in certain ways, and
why images of suspects were not released for more than seven months); Josh
Gerstein, President Obama’s Muddy Transparency Record, POLITICO (Mar. 5,
2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73606.html#ixzz2W1G4hzIy
(Katherine Meyer, an attorney who specializes in access to government docu-
ments under the Freedom of Information Act, told Politico that Obama “ad-
ministration is the worst [since President Gerald Ford’s] on FOIA issues. The
worst. There’s just no question about it”); Special Report with Bret Baier, FOX
NEWS (June 2013),
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In 2005, President Bush nominated Judge John Roberts to be
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.96 Senator
Patrick Leahy expressed concerns that Judge Roberts, as an at-
torney in the Reagan administration, had indicated that Con-
gress had no authority to end ongoing military hostilities.97
Judge Roberts explained that he was being “vigilant to protect
the executive’s authority.”98 He argued that regardless of the
presidential administration, the decision of when “hostilities
should cease” would be reserved to the President.99 Ted Ken-
nedy, who played a prominent role in promoting greater U.S. re-
spect for international law,100 called the Roberts nomination pro-
cess a “choreographed appearance[]” in the context of “unprece-
dented claims by the White House for sweeping expansions of
presidential power that are grave threats to the rule of law.”101
http://archive.org/details/tv?time=201306&q=washington&fq=pro-
gram:%22Special+Report+With+Bret+Baier%22 (Sen. John McCain, Ranking
Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, argued that Obama ad-
ministration is “least transparent in recent times”); Sabrina Siddiqui, John
McCain, Lindsey Graham Stand By Susan Rice Claims Despite Release Of Ben-
ghazi Emails [Update], HUFFINGTON POST (May 21, 2013), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2013/05/21/john-mccain-susan-rice_n_3314212.html (McCain told
The Huffington Post that with respect to Sept. 11, 2012, attack on the U.S.
outpost in Benghazi, Libya, members of Congress “still don’t know the names
of the survivors. We still haven’t had any interviews with them. . . . There’s
now more questions to be answered than there were eight months ago.”). The
Obama administration has been more hostile to disclosure of information to
the press concerning its foreign policy than was the Bush administration. Cf.
Morning Joe, MSNBC (May 15, 2013), http://dailybail.com/home/bush-attor-
ney-general-we-refused-to-target-the-media.html.
96. See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICANDEMOCRACY (2008).
97. PBS Newshour, John Roberts: Supreme Court Nomination Hearings
YOUTUBE (2005), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PNF_pwkP6gg.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. For example, he cosponsored the Genocide Accountability Act and the
Torture Victims Protection Act. 153 CONG. REC. S8325 (daily ed. Mar. 29,
2007); 137 CONG. REC. S1369-S1380 (daily ed. January 31, 1991).
101. Senator Edward Kennedy, Sen. Kennedy Speaks on the Nomination of
Samuel Alito (Jan. 19, 2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/19/AR2006011902515.html.
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B. The Doctrinal Pillars of Impunity for Violations of Interna-
tional Criminal Law
Under the Bush and Obama administrations, the Department
of Justice and Office of Legal Counsel painted a complex tapes-
try of impunity under the ATS for genocide, other mass atroci-
ties, and massive human rights violations.102 The pillars of this
theory of comprehensive impunity are as follows: (1) no extrater-
ritorial application of the ATS to foreign defendants or crimes
committed abroad, (2) no responsibility on the part of nonstate
actors for crimes, (3) the sovereign immunity of foreign states
and their current and former officials, (4) no enforceability of hu-
man-rights or war-crimes treaties or the law of nations—along
with the unfettered discretion on the part of Congress and the
executive to gut international law using reservations and decla-
rations—and (5) the routine invocation of courts’ alleged discre-
tion to withhold jurisdiction in most ATS cases. The theory as a
whole follows logically from the “Bush doctrine” and “Obama
102. Impunity is the state of affairs in which serious crimes are going unpun-
ished. Cf. Rome Statute, supra note 23, at 1003 (“[a]ffirming that the most se-
rious crimes...must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution
must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing
international cooperation”). The fight against impunity is hundreds of years
old. Cf. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1675 (2013)
(Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concurring in the judg-
ment) (citing EMMERICH DEVATTEL, LAW OFNATIONS, BOOK II, § 76, 163 (1758),
as stating that it is “pretty generally observed” practice in “respect to great
crimes, which are equally contrary to the laws and safety of all nations,” that
a sovereign should not “suffer his subjects to molest the subjects of other states,
or to do them an injury,” but should “compel the transgressor to make repara-
tion for the damage or injury,” or be “deliver[ed] ... up to the offended state, to
be there brought to justice”) (internal quotations omitted). Impunity is a term
often used by the United States government to refer to violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law or of human rights law that have not been remedied,
often in African countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Rwanda, or Sudan, or
in Latin American countries such as Colombia or Guatemala. See, e.g., Press
Release, The White House, EU-US Declaration on Working Together to Pro-
mote Peace, Stability, Prosperity, and Good Governance in Africa (June 20,
2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/re-
leases/2005/06/20050620-3.html (“We are . . . [s]upporting broad and inclusive
processes of implementing the comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan, ca-
pable of reconciling and accommodating the aspirations of all sectors of society
and all regions of the country, while ensuring that the fight against impunity
from violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law is
sustained.”).
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doctrine” of preemptive war in violation of the U.N. Charter.103
Rather than basing the legality of war exclusively on self-de-
fense, these doctrines call for the consideration of “vital national
interests” in the determination of a conflict’s legality under the
law of nations.104
First, although the ATS traditionally applied extraterritorially
by its very terms,105 the executive branch attempted to change
that. It had long been known that torture was a prime candidate
for ATS jurisdiction.106 During the 1990s, the United States sup-
ported extraterritorial application of the ATS, at least as against
103. See Tai-Heng Cheng & Eduardas Valaitis, Shaping an Obama Doctrine
of Preemptive Force, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 737, 740, 753–56 (2009).
104. Id. at 740 (citing Senator Barack Obama, Address to the B’nai Torah
Congregation in Boca Raton, Florida (May 22, 2008) (transcript available at
http://votersforpeace.us/press/index.php?itemid=320)). See also Interview with
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Remarks on “American Global Leadership”
at the Center For American Progress (Oct. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/10/175340.htm (not-
ing that Obama administration’s military action in support of President
Obama’s “values and interests” included “military action” in Libya to destroy
the nation’s air defenses; no claim of self-defense).
105. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607) (ATS con-
ferred federal jurisdiction over dispute relating to trespass or replevin of hu-
man “property,” although it arose on high seas). This was in accordance with
the principle of English law that a tort committed in Paris could follow the
tortfeasor to London. McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 241, 248 (1843); The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (1 Wheat) 66, 116–17 (1825) (Marshall, J.) (under English
law, an American engaged in slave trade and intercepted by a British cruiser
attempting to prohibit the trade could nevertheless sue for violation of “some
right that has been violated by the capture, [or] some property [other than
slaves] of which he has been dispossessed and to which he ought to be re-
stored.”) (quoting The Amedie, 1 Acton 240). The drafter of the ATS applied
this doctrine as a judge prior to enactment of the ATS. See Br. of Professors of
Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History as Amici Curiae in Support of Respond-
ents, supra note 44, at 23 (citing Stoddard v. Bird, 1 Kirby 65, 68 (Conn. 1786)
(Ellsworth, J.)).
106. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OFTHEFOREIGNRELATIONSLAW OF THEUNITED STATES § 702(n) (1987).
Torture is a vague and ambiguous concept under U.S. law, but it probably in-
cludes harsh beatings, electric shocks, and “extreme pain” caused by binding a
detainee tightly, or by suspending him or her in midair. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340
(2000); COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 101-30, at 9, 14 (1990); Implementation of the
Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(3) (2003); U.N. Comm.
Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Comm.
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official enemies of the administration such as the leaders of the
Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska).107 In the 1970s, it
even supported such application against acts taking place in cur-
rent or former allies such as Paraguay.108 Starting in late 2001,
and with growing frequency from 2002 through 2004, there were
allegations of abuse of detainees and violations of international
law at Guantanamo Bay naval station, in Cuba, and at Abu
Ghraib prison, in Iraq.109 In response, the government argued
“that the Executive Branch possesses the unchecked authority
to imprison indefinitely any persons, foreign citizens included,
on territory under the sole jurisdiction and control of the United
States, without permitting such prisoners recourse of any kind
to any judicial forum, or even access to counsel, regardless of the
length or manner of their confinement.”110 In 2006-2007, the
Bush administration filed several amici briefs with the U.S.
Against Torture, U.N. Comm. Against Torture on its 36th Sess., May 1-19,
2006, ¶¶ 13–14, 24, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May 18, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/133838.pdf; Jordan J. Paust,
The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanctions,
43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1535, 1537–45, 1553–69 (2009); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Af-
firming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1231, 1241, 1250–54
(2005).
107. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 1995).
108. See Burley, supra note 35, at 463.
109. Al Odah v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 60–61 (D.D.C. 2002), on
appeal, Case No. 03-343 (2003); Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d
1036, 1038–39 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Coalition
of Clergy, Lawyers and Professors v. Bush 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002);
Gherebi v. Bush, 262 F. Supp. 2d. 1064, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d, 374 F.3d
727 (9th Cir. 2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 458–62 (4th Cir. 2003),
vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 60–61 (D.D.C.
2002) rev’d sub nom. Al Odah v. U.S., 103 Fed. App’x. 676 (D.C. Cir. 2004);
Supreme Court, Orders in Pending Cases [Rasul v. Bush, 03-334 (2003) and Al
Odah v. United States, No. 03-343], Decided June 28, 2004, http://www.su-
premecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/111003pzor.pdf; cf. Br. for Pet’r, at 4–6,
El Shifa Pharmaceutical Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (No. 07-5174) (arguing that the Supreme Court rejected Bush admin-
istration’s argument in a series of cases that determinations of the status of
enemy combatants under Uniform Code of Military Justice, Geneva Conven-
tions, and laws and customs of war were non-justiciable political questions).
110. Gherebi, 352 F.3d at 1283. See also Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Un-
lawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret Rendi-
tions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH
L. REV. 345, 397 (2007); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Tor-
ture Under the Bush Administration, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389, 391
(2006).
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Courts of Appeals contending that the ATS is “‘narrow’” and
should have no “extraterritorial application.”111One brief argued
that Congress did not intend the ATS to reach “purely extrater-
ritorial claims,” even though it has no “geographical limitation”
on “torts.”112
The argument against an extraterritorial ATS blended into
one for a unitary executive, which requested significant expan-
sions of executive immunity for jus cogens violations and the act
of state doctrine. The core of the argument consisted of a plea
that the courts never “review a foreign government’s treatment
of its own citizens” or tolerate any “significant risk to the foreign
policy interests of the United States.”113 President Bush’s head
of the Office of Legal Counsel, Jack Goldsmith, persuaded Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy that no other nation has recognized uni-
versal civil jurisdiction over torts arising under the law of na-
tions.114 This conclusion was erroneous, according to the amici
111. Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Def. at 10–15,
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing Br. for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 2 05-36210
(9th Cir.); Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Mujica v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., No. 05-56175 (9th Cir.), and quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715);
see also Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1–15, 28, Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 07-0016)
2007 WL 7073754; Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289.
112. Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Sarei at 11–13, supra note
111.
113. Id. at 13–14. Jus cogens or peremptory norms of international law are
binding, non-derogable norms, such as the prohibitions on genocide, the slave
trade, and torture. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (May 23,
1969); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OFFOREIGNRELATIONSLAWOF THEUNITEDSTATES
§ 702 (1987). Such norms are also generative of a sort of universal standing to
assert them, i.e. of erga omnes duties to all States and correlative interests of
all States in invoking them. See Larry Catá Backer, From Constitution to Con-
stitutionalism: A Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power Systems, 113
PENN ST. L. REV. 671, 683 n.43 (2009) (citing Barcelona Traction, Light &
Power Co. (2d Phase) (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (Feb. 5)).
114. Justice Kennedy stated “no other nation in the world permits its court
to exercise universal civil jurisdiction over alleged extraterritorial human
rights abuses to which the nation has no connection.” Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 3–4, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-
1491), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_tran-
scripts/10-1491.pdf, quoted in Jeffrey Rosen, Corporations Are People When
They Donate to Campaigns—But Not When They Violate Human Rights, NEW
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briefs in Kiobel, Samantar, and Sosa.115 These arguments culmi-
nated in the decision in Kiobel, in which Chief Justice Roberts
REPUBLIC PLANK BLOG (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.newrepub-
lic.com/blog/plank/107998/corporations-are-people-when-they-donate—cam-
paigns—-not-when-they-violate-human-ri#.
115. See Br. for the American Jewish Congress as Amici Curiae Supp. Pet’r,
at 8, 37, Samantar v. Yousef, 560 U.S. 305 (No. 08-1555),
http://www.oyez.org/sites/default/files/cases/briefs/pdf/brief__08-1555__1.pdf;
Br. for Australian Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Supp. of Pet’rs, Kiobel, 133
S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491), http://www.losangelesemploymentlawyer.com/Aus-
tralian-Law-Scholars.pdf; Br. for the European Commission on Behalf of the
European Union as Amicus Curiae, at 25–26, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659; Br. of
Amicus Curiae Juan E. Mendez, supra note 21, at 13, 34–35; Br. for Interna-
tional Human Rights Organizations on Reargument as Amici Curiae in Supp.
of Pet’rs, at 19–23, 30–39, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659, https://ccrjustice.org/files/10-
1491%20tsac%20International%20Human%20Rights%20Organizations.pdf;
Br. for Professors of Public International Law as Amici Curiae in Supp. of
Resp’s, Samantar v. Yousef, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08-1555), reprinted in 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 609, 622–28 (2011), http://repository.uchas-
tings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1315&context=faculty_scholarship; Br.
for South African Jurists as Amici Curiae in Supp. of Pet’rs, at 5–6, Kiobel, 133
S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). The Court of Appeals for the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland ruled in 1994 that a Kuwaiti could sue
three other Kuwaitis for torture in Kuwait followed by threatening phone calls
to him in Britain. See Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, 100 ILR 463 (Eng. C.A. 1994), fur-
ther proceedings at 103 ILR 420 (Eng. Q.B. 1995), 107 ILR 536 (Eng. C.A.
1996). Under the civil procedure code of France, the criminal procedure code of
Germany, and the judiciary law of Spain, a victim may bring a claim for mon-
etary compensation ancillary to a criminal charge for extraterritorial genocide,
crimes against humanity, or war crimes. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 762–63 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (“criminal courts of
many nations combine civil and criminal proceedings, allowing those injured
by criminal conduct to be represented, and to recover damages, in the criminal
proceeding itself. Thus, universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily contem-
plates a significant degree of civil tort recovery as well.”) (citing Br. for Euro-
pean Commission as Amicus Curiae, at 21, n.48, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (Nos. 03-
339, 03-485); Br. of Amicus Curiae Juan E. Mendez, supra note 21, at 34–35
(citing Kovac v. Karadžic, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Judgment of
March 14, 2011); 3 YVES DONZALLAZ, LA CONVENTION DE LUGANO DU 16
SEPTEMBRE 1998 CONCERNANT LA COMPETENCE JUDICIAIRE ET L’EXECUTION DES
DECISIONS EN MATIERE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE, ¶¶ 5203-5272 (1998); EC
Council Regulation Art. 5, § 4, 2001/44, 2001 O.J. (L 012) (Jan. 16, 2001));
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE SCOPE OF UNIVERSAL
CIVIL JURISDICTION (2012), http://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/de-
fault/files/Amnesty%20International%20-%20Universal%20Jurisdic-
tion_%20The%20scope%20of%20universal%20civil%20jurisdic-
tion%20_%20Amnesty%20International.pdf (“[M]any states, including Aus-
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concluded that the ATS could not apply to conduct outside the
United States even though the defendant was present in the
United States, reasoning that “accepting [the contrary] view
would imply that other nations, also applying the law of nations,
could hale our citizens into their courts for alleged violations of
the law of nations occurring in the United States, or anywhere
else in the world.”116
Second, there was a trend away from non-state responsibility
for mass atrocities under the ATS. Theoretically, non-state lia-
bility should be even more readily subject to ATS actions, due to
the lesser impact on U.S. foreign policy priorities and on the ju-
dicial doctrine of sovereign immunity.117 As long as the person
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, permit their courts to
entertain civil claims in an action civile in criminal cases which are based on
universal criminal jurisdiction.”) (citing Br. for European Communities as
Amicus Curiae, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692); id. (“courts in [many] countries can exer-
cise jurisdiction in criminal cases over civil claims based on torts committed
abroad”) (collecting sources). See also Kate Parlett, Universal Civil Jurisdic-
tion for Torture, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 385, 385 (2007) (arguing that it
should be allowable under international law for domestic courts to exercise ju-
risdiction in civil claims for torture on the basis of universal civil jurisdiction);
Donald Francis Donovan and Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of
Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, n.82 (2006) (collecting
statutes). France and Germany exercise universal criminal jurisdiction over
extraterritorial genocide, in fact. See, e.g., AFP, France Orders First Rwandan
Genocide Trial – Rwanda, FRANCE 24 (Apr 3, 2013),
www.france24.com/en/20130402-france-rwanda-genocide-trial-pascal-simbi-
kangwa. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that British law provided for tran-
sitory actions for trespass to be filed by one foreigner against another in Eng-
land “for trespasses committed . . . out of the realm, or . . . without the king’s
foreign dominion.”McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 241, 241, 249 (1843). The
South African courts have exercised civil jurisdiction over torts committed by
one foreigner on another on the high seas. See Br. for South African Jurists
Anton Katz, Maz Du Plessis, and Christopher Gevers, in Supp. of Pet’rs at 5–
6, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) (citing Wallace v. Hill & Scheinman
(1828) 1 Menz. 347; Hill v. Wallace, (1829) 1 Menz. 347).
116. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
117. Cf. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES pt. II, introductory note (1986) (“Individuals may be held liable
for offenses against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and geno-
cide.”); Justin Lu, Jurisdiction over Non-State Activity Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 531, 547 (1997) (“With respect to gen-
ocide and war crimes, the Kadic court was able to point to a number of inter-
national documents that impose liability on private individuals for such acts.”);
see also Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
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acts under “color of law” or as a co-conspirator or aider and abet-
tor of state action, there should be no issue with his or her status
as a private individual, former official, militia leader, warlord,
or head of an unrecognized state.118 Restriction of non-state lia-
bility therefore tends toward judicial repeal of the ATS itself.
When combined with sovereign immunity or the act of state or
political question doctrine, refusal of non-state-actor liability
has a whipsaw effect on victims. Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit
has rejected non-state liability for torture, even while noting
that most of the offenses covered by the ATS, and especially pi-
racy, may be committed by non-state actors.119
Third, the Bush and Obama administrations were vigorous
proponents of the concept of sovereign immunity for state offi-
cials who perpetrate or conspire in mass atrocities such as gen-
ocide and large-scale terrorism. Prior to 2001, there was judicial
authority to the effect that a foreign official has no immunity for
“private or criminal” acts.120 With respect to the ATS, the Bush
(holding that non-state terrorist groups could be liable for targeting people un-
der the ATS based on law of nations standards set forth in the Genocide Con-
vention and the Rome Statute: “Acts of genocide and crimes against humanity
violate the law of nations and these norms are of sufficient specificity and def-
initeness to be recognized under the ATS.”).
118. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41–42 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017–21 (7th Cir.
2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,671 F.3d 736, 747–49, 759–60, 764–65 (9th Cir.
2011) (en banc); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582
F.3d 244, 254–55 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 122 and 131 S. Ct. 79
(2010); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 173 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th
Cir. 2009); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1316 (11th Cir. 2008);
Kadic, 70 F.3d 232; Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876; Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front,
993 F. Supp. 3, 5–6 (D.D.C. 1998); Statement of Interest of the United States,
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-9035); Br. for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga, supra note 59; Jordan J. Paust, Human
Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801
(2002).
119. Ali Shafi, 642 F.3d at 1089–1100; Ali Shafi, 642 F.3d. at 1099–1100
(Williams, J., concurring).
120. United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (citing In re Doe, 860 F.2d
40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988)); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., 657 F.
Supp. 2d 700, 711 (E.D. Va. 2009) (citing Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 24 L.Ed.
1018 (1878); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115 (1851); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S.
170 (1804); Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga, supra note
59. Cf. also Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5, 11 (1973); Von Zedtwitz v. Suth-
erland, 26 F.2d 525–26 (D.C. Cir. 1925); In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d
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administration contended that the executive branch’s extension
of immunity to an official of China or some other state is conclu-
sive on the courts, regardless of the death toll, heinousness of
the conduct, or persecutory zeal of the official.121Harold Koh has
argued that “America’s new diplomatic strategy emphasizes
strategic unilateralism and tactical multilateralism, character-
ized by a broad antipathy toward international law and global
regime-building through treaty negotiation.”122 Sued for geno-
cide and other offenses due to the mass spraying of poisonous
gases in Vietnam, the Bush administration argued that it had
“Commander in Chief” immunity from the suit under “separa-
tion of powers.”123 The Bush administration had previously been
supportive of Asian dictatorships’ attempts to dismiss ATS suits:
[The] Bush administration changed course, filing a new state-
ment of interest in Unocal objecting to the lawsuit, the start of
a generally disapproving approach toward ATS litigation. This
approach may have been driven in part by ideology and strong
views of executive branch primacy. But there are functionalist
justifications for the change in attitude toward ATS lawsuits,
which in the 1980s andmost of the 1990s “involved abuses com-
mitted under regimes that were defunct and repudiated by
their successors, nearly universally shunned by other govern-
ments, possessed of, at best, uncertain claims to statehood or
legitimate state power, lacking in geopolitical significance, po-
litically unimportant to Washington, or clearly condemned by
the United States.” The first decade of the twenty-first century,
by contrast, has seen a wave of ATS lawsuits against corpora-
tions and existing regimes that have prompted complaints
from some foreign governments, including U.S. allies. . . .
99 (citing U.S. Const., art. II, § 3; Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 606
(1927); Valentine v. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 14, & n.12 (1936); Francis v. Fran-
cis, 203 U.S. 233, 240 (1906); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890); Chew Heong
v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 563 (1884); Expert op. of Prof. Jordan Paust, In
re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)); Bond v. United States, 2
Ct. Cl. 533 (1866).
121. Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 626 (7th Cir 2004). See also Doe v. State of
Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 111 (D.D.C. 2005) (“When, as here, the Executive
has filed a Suggestion of Immunity as to a recognized head of a foreign state,
the jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch immediately ceases.”).
122. Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2354
(2006).
123. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d at 43–44.
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The first example involves lawsuits against Chinese officials
for human rights abuses, which present a critical case study for
determining the foreign policy costs of ATS litigation. China
has the most important and perhaps the most volatile bilateral
relationship with the United States. China is a rising power
and, some argue, a potential rival for geopolitical dominance.
Due to its role as a major U.S. creditor, China holds some lev-
erage over U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, China may be partic-
ularly sensitive to ATS litigation. The governing Communist
Party of China (CPC) has proven especially skillful at invoking
the long history of imperialism and abuses by Western coun-
tries to stoke the fires of nationalism and resentment against
the United States. ATS litigation is arguably more likely to im-
pose substantial foreign policy costs in this context than in any
other.
Only five ATS lawsuits have been brought concerning activities
in China. Three were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, one
ended in settlement, and one resulted in a declaratory judg-
ment with no damages awarded. One suit was brought by stu-
dent leaders of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests against Li
Peng, the former Premier of China, for alleged human rights
abuses. Former prisoners also brought suit against Li Peng,
various state entities, and the Adidas Corporation for human
rights abuses, including forced prison labor. Although the ser-
vice of the complaint on Li Peng during a visit to the United
States prompted angry denunciations from the Chinese gov-
ernment, both claims against government officials were dis-
missed on sovereign immunity grounds. Three other cases
arose from the 1999 crackdown by the Chinese government on
the Falun Gong spiritual movement. Falun Gong practitioners
filed lawsuits against three Chinese government officials, in-
cluding former President Jiang Zemin, the Beijing Mayor, Dep-
uty Governor of Liaoning Province, and the Chinese Com-
munist Party Secretary for Sichuan Province. Two cases were
dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds. In another, Doe v.
Qi, the defendant refused to appear and the court issued a de-
claratory judgment in favor of the plaintiffs without awarding
damages because it “pose[d] the least threat to foreign rela-
tions. . . .”
The U.S. State Department filed statements of interest in these
cases on behalf of the defendant Chinese officials, arguing that
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the litigation would interfere with the conduct of U.S. foreign
policy.124
Then, in 2006-2007, the Bush administration blended its argu-
ment against extraterritorial application of the ATS in Sarei and
Kiobel with appeals for sweeping sovereign immunity for jus co-
gens violations, and/or a significant expansion of the act of state
doctrine.125 The administration justified immunity by asking
that the courts never infringe upon a unitary executive by at-
tempting to “review a foreign government’s treatment of its own
citizens” nor tolerate any other “significant risk to the foreign
policy interests of the United States.”126 This trend culminated
in 2009, when the Obama administration successfully urged the
sovereign immunity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for financ-
124. Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1117, 1151–53 (2011) (citing, inter alia, Statement of Interest of the
United States, at 7, Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C02-
0672), http://www.cja.org/downloads/LiuQi_Statement_of_Interest
_of_the_US_85.pdf; Statement of Interest of the United States at 2–3, Zhou v.
Peng, 286 F. Supp. 2d 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 00 Civ. 6446),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16671.pdf; Supp. Br. for the
United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 11-15, Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d
932 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628).
125. Br. for The United States as Amicus Curiae, Sarei, supra note 111, at
10–15; Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Talisman Energy, supra
note 107, at 5.
126. See generally Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Sarei, supra
note 111, at 13–14. In Kiobel, Nigeria’s treatment of its citizens of the Ogoni
ethnic and religious group was at issue. 133 S. Ct. at 1662−63. Amounting to
less than one percent of Nigeria’s population, the Ogoni people’s language be-
long to a language family spoken by less than six percent of the population,
and its religious beliefs of Christianity or traditional Yaa practice differ from
the Muslim religion of the Hausa and Fulani plurality in Nigeria. See Data:
Assessment for Ogoni in Nigeria, Minorities at Risk Project, University of Mar-
yland, College Park (2014-2015), http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assess-
ment.asp?groupId=47504. In the 1990s, the Nigerian government and its allies
killed about 2,000 Ogoni people in response to what started out as peaceful
protests. See id. In 2001, the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights recognized that Nigeria had “given the green light to private actors, and
the oil Companies in particular, to devastatingly affect the well-being of the
Ogonis.” The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for
Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 155/96 (2001), para. 58, http://www1.umn.edu/hu-
manrts/africa/comcases/155-96.html.
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ing and materially supporting the persons behind the 9/11 at-
tacks.127 Some of the 9/11 families advocated unsuccessfully for
a “long” time in favor of legislation that would make al Qaeda’s
financers liable for its massacres.128 Four spouses and a parent
of 9/11 victims have asked for an end to the cover-up of the Saudi
role.129 The entire episode has reflected an abdication of the right
127. See Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Federal Insurance Co.
v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 557 U.S. 935 (2009), (No. 08-640) http://www.jus-
tice.gov/osg/briefs/2008/2pet/6invit/2008-0640.pet.ami.inv.html; see also
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11–12 (2009),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153980.pdf:
[T]he United States filed a brief in the Supreme Court opposing a pe-
tition for writ of certiorari by persons injured in the September 11,
2001 attacks, the families and representatives of decedents, and in-
surers, who alleged, among other things, that Saudi Arabia and sev-
eral high-ranking Saudi officials bore responsibility for the attacks be-
cause they had funded ostensible charities they knew were diverting
funds to al Qaeda.. . . The United States argued that the Supreme
Court should not grant review of the case because “[t]he lower courts
correctly concluded that Saudi Arabia and its officials are immune
from suit for governmental acts outside the United States.”
Id.
128. See Press Release, Office of Sen. Charles Schumer,On 9/11 Anniversary,
Schumer Announces ‘Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act’ - Long Sought
After By 9/11 Families - Has Cleared Senate Judiciary Committee with Sweep-
ing Support (Sept. 11, 2014), available at http//www.schumer.sen-
ate.gov/Newsroom/record.cfm?id=355300.
129. See Press Release, Office of Rep. Walter Jones, Jones, Lynch, And
Massie Host Press Conference On Resolution To Declassify 28 Pages In The
Joint Inquiry Report On The 9/11 Attacks (Sept. 10, 2014), available at
https://jones.house.gov/press-release/jones-lynch-and-massie-host-press-con-
ference-resolution-declassify-28-pages-joint-0 (as a new House “resolution
states that declassification of the pages [on the Saudi government’s role in
9/11] is necessary to provide the American public with the full truth surround-
ing the tragic events of September 11, 2001, particularly relating to the in-
volvement of foreign governments,” the survivors of 9/11 victims speaking in
favor of the resolution “includ[ed] Terry Strada, co-chair of 9/11 Families
United for Justice Against Terrorism and widow of Tom Strada (1 WTC vic-
tim); Matt Sellitto, father of Matthew Sellitto (1 WTC victim); Abraham Scott,
widower of Janice Scott (Pentagon victim); Emanuel Lipscomb (WTC survivor);
Ellen Saracini, widow of Victor Saracini (pilot of United Airlines Flight 175,
which crashed into 2 WTC).”).
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and duty to protect U.S. persons.130 This may contribute to mis-
trust and animus toward Arabs who had nothing to do with
9/11.131
Fourth, the idea that the law of nations is not “self-executing”
was popularized by Judge Robert Bork in 1984.132 The Bush ad-
ministration supported the dismissal of many claims involving
130. Cf. Michael J. Frank,U.S. Military Courts and the War in Iraq, 39 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’LL. 645, 755–56 & n.468 (2006) (describing a nation’s right to pro-
tect its nationals from terrorist attacks, even if planned or committed over-
seas). In 2013, the Obama administration denied relief to 9/11 victims by de-
clining to add Saudi Arabia to the list of state sponsors of terrorism even
though Saudi government-sponsored organizations had allegedly funded
Osama bin Laden and thereby the 9/11 attacks. See In re Terrorist Attacks on
September 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 109, 111–18 & n.7 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that
because Saudi Arabia was not on the list, and tort of funding 9/11 occurred
outside the United States, 9/11 survivors and families of those murdered had
no claim under ATS, the Anti-Terrorism Act, or TVPA). The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act provides for liability for foreign terrorist acts if the relevant
nation-state is listed as a state sponsor as a result of the act giving rise to the
suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (2000); Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
333 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that this section, which was “added
as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, allowed
an exception to the immunity bar if plaintiffs showed that the foreign state had
been designated a state sponsor of terrorism when the act occurred or as a
result of the act.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7)(A) (2000)). Although the purpose
of the Anti-Terrorism Act was to provide a claim for compensation to victims
of international terrorism, it has not been fully implemented in the 9/11 case.
See In re September 11 Litig., 751 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir. 2014) ("The purpose of
the ATA was '[t]o provide a new civil cause of action in Federal law for inter-
national terrorism that provides extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist acts
abroad against United States nationals.'") (quoting H.R. 2222, 102d Cong.
(1992)).
131. See Adrien Katherine Wing, International Law, Secularism, and the Is-
lamic World, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 407, 426 (2009).
132. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798–823 (D.C. Cir.
1984). Judge Bork was unable to find any quotations to support his use of the
term “self-executing” to make the ATS “law of nations” clause unenforceable.
The most relevant case he cited actually stated that a treaty may confer rights
upon persons, is entitled to equal treatment with a statute, and may be en-
forced via a statute such as the ATS. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598–
99 (1884). Prior to his opinion, the judicial consensus was that even the “prac-
tice of nations” and “writing[s]” of “jurists” could form the “law of nations,”
which could then be enforced as U.S. common law and under the ATS. The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 701–12 (1900); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 880–81 (2d Cir. 1980); 1 U.S. Op Att’y Gen. 26, 27 (1792). The other
judges criticized Judge Bork for attempting to judicially void the ATS without
constitutional warrant. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775–823.
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murders, assaults, and other human-rights and humanitarian-
law violations on the grounds that the law of nations in this area
is not “self-executing.”133 In Sosa, the Supreme Court held that
a treaty could not provide the rule of decision in an ATS case if
it was not “self-executing.”134 Between 2004 and 2006, it engaged
in legal gymnastics in order to apply the Geneva Conventions
without finding them to be self-executing treaties, perhaps in or-
der to make violations of the conventions into a domestic rather
than a global issue.135 The Second Circuit declared the Nurem-
berg principles and the Geneva Conventions to be unenforceable
under the ATS.136 In 2008, the Supreme Court held that “[i]nter-
national agreements, even those directly benefiting private per-
sons, generally do not create private rights or . . . cause[s] of ac-
tion.”137 Such rulings violate the interests of all other States
party to a treaty that it will be enforced.138
The effect of the Roberts Court’s action inMedellin is to under-
mine the original understanding of the law of nations. It was
well-established by the 1980s that treaties and other interna-
tional law norms could be the “law of the land” under the Su-
premacy Clause, notwithstanding the failure of Congress to cod-
ify them separately.139 The Vienna Convention on the Law of
133. See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1025–27 (W.D.
Wash. 2005) (extrajudicial killings and disproportionate use of force claims dis-
missed as based on non-self-executing International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (dismissing claim based on cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment as based on non-self-executing norms of international law).
134. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004): William Dodge, Cor-
porate Liability Under Customary International Law, 43 GEO. INT’L L.J. 1043,
1049 (2012).
135. See Aya Gruber, Sending the Self-Execution Doctrine to the Executioner,
3 FIU L. REV. 57, 87–94 (2007-2008) (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518–20, and
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2794–98, as “roundabout,” “by hook or by crook” ap-
proaches to burying issue of whether Geneva Conventions of 1949 represent
the Supreme Law of the Land).
136. Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange, 517 F.3d at 122–23 (2d Cir.
2008) (war-crimes treaties lack Sosa’s “black-letter rules”).
137. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 n.3 (2008).
138. See John Quigley, Judge Bork is Wrong: The Covenant is the Law, 71
WASH. U. L. Q. 1087, 1102 (1993).
139. United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2000) (cit-
ing Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991); Kreimerman v.
Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 638–39 (5th Cir. 1994));
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFFOREIGNRELATIONSLAWOF THEUNITEDSTATES § 111,
reporter’s note 5 (1987).
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Treaties provides that the United States has a duty to execute
in “good faith” every treaty to which it is a party, and to limit
treaty reservations to those which do not defeat a treaty’s pur-
pose.140 Thus, prior to the Roberts Court, a treaty awaiting im-
plementation or restricted in its implementation to a criminal
rather than a civil matter could have had the force of law in the
United States, including under the ATS.141 The strong presump-
tion against the creation of private rights by treaties—and other
provisions of the law of nations—will prevent many principles of
international law from having an effect in the United States.142
The strict construction of federal statutes frequently prevents
even the treaties that the Senate separately codifies from having
their intended effect.143
There is a conflict between the principle that aiding and abet-
ting is not actionable under ATS, and the pervasiveness of aiding
and abetting under other U.S. laws, including other civil and in-
ternational laws. The Bush administration recognized the incon-
gruity of its argument that aiding and abetting genocide or tor-
ture is not actionable under the ATS, when it conceded that at
least one other federal court of appeals had recognized aiding
140. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
141. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 283 (2d. Cir. 2007)
(rejecting position that non-self-executing treaties “are without any eviden-
tiary value with regard to the state of current customary international law.…
[I]n Kadic we relied on the Genocide Convention to determine the shape of the
international proscription of genocide and made clear that ‘the legislative de-
cision not to create a new private remedy does not imply that a private remedy
is not already available under the [ATCA].’”), subsequent proceedings at 02
MDL 1499 (SAS), 2014 WL 1569423 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2014) (quoting Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241–42 (2d Cir. 1995)). See also Safety Nat. Cas. Corp.
v. Certain Underwriters, 587 F.3d 714, 728–29 (5th Cir. 2009) (treaty awaiting
implementation had force of law for preemption purposes).
142. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 508 n.3; see also John Quigley, The New World
Order and the Rule of Law, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 75, 109 (1992) (“If
the world is to be, in President [George H.W.] Bush’s words, ‘stronger in the
pursuit of justice,’ the United States must change its attitude toward interna-
tional adjudication and must not use military force in ways that violate the
rights of other states and peoples.”).
143. SeeMohamed v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012) (term “in-
dividual” in Torture Victims Protection Act does not cover entities or organiza-
tions, even though at least one dictionary definition and some federal statutes
define “individual” to include a group of beings).
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and abetting liability under the ATS, that the law of nations rec-
ognizes both aiding and abetting under a knowledge standard
and joint criminal enterprises to commit genocide, and that in
2002 the “United States successfully argued in favor of aiding-
and-abetting liability” in cases of terrorism.144 Under both fed-
eral and state common law of crimes and torts, aiding and abet-
ting was traditionally actionable.145 The writing of aiding and
abetting liability out of the ATS effectively revises it by
“treat[ing] torts in violation of the law of nations less favorably
than other torts.”146
As the concurring justices pointed out in Kiobel, Congress is
not to blame for this “self-execution” problem, as it has taken
many steps to make genocide, torture, and persecution actiona-
ble:
Congress has ratified treaties obliging the United States to find
and punish foreign perpetrators of serious crimes committed
against foreign persons abroad. . . .
And Congress has sometimes authorized civil damages in such
cases. . . .
Congress, while aware of the award of civil damages under the
ATS—including cases such as Filartiga with foreign plaintiffs,
144. Br. for United States as Amicus Curiae, Talisman Energy, supra note
111, at 17 (citing Cabello v. Fernandes-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005));
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002); Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, 340 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); Prosecutor v. Blaškic, No. IT-95-14-A, ¶ 49 (ICTY App. Chamber, July
29, 2004).; Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment (ICTR Trial
Chamber Jan. 27, 2000)).
145. See Br. for Earthrights International as Amicus Curiae, Talisman En-
ergy, supra note 111, at 21–22 (citing, inter ala, Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494,
500 (2000); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F. 3d 767, 776 (9th Cir. 1996); In re
Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539, 565 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); Richardson v. Saltar, 4 N.C. 505, 507 (1817); State v. McDonald, 14 N.C.
(3 Dev.) 468, 471–72 (1832); Purviance v. Angus, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 180, 184–85
(Pa. 1786); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1977)). Eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century publicists of international law regarded the sufferance of
injuries against foreign subjects to be an offense to their governments, and that
approval or ratification of such acts makes them attributable and gives rise to
just as much of a duty to make reparation as if the nation had committed the
injury itself. See Anthony Bellia Jr. & Bradford Clark, The Alien Tort Statute
and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 473–74 (2011).
146. Br. for Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History as Amici
Curiae in Supp. of Resp’s, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 372 (2004), (Nos.
03-339, 03-485), reprinted in 28 HASTINGS INT’L&COMP. L. REV. 99, 110 (2004).
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defendants, and conduct—has not sought to limit the statute’s
jurisdictional or substantive reach. Rather, Congress has en-
acted other statutes, and not only criminal statutes, that allow
the United States to prosecute (or allow victims to obtain dam-
ages from) foreign persons who injure foreign victims by com-
mitting abroad torture, genocide, and other heinous acts. . . .
[Congress provided a] private right of action on behalf of indi-
viduals harmed by an act of torture or extrajudicial killing com-
mitted “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of
any foreign nation. . . .” [Its] purpose [was] to “mak[e] sure that
torturers and death squads will no longer have a safe haven in
the United States,” by “providing a civil cause of action in U.S.
courts for torture committed abroad.”147
In the course of confirming the cause of action for torture, Con-
gress endorsed the “unambiguous basis for a cause of action that
has been successfully maintained under an existing law [(i.e.,
the ATS)].”148 The Supreme Court has held that torture claims
against individuals are not subject to sovereign immunity, in a
case involving an individual tortured by Somali government
forces.149
Finally, discretionary doctrines such as political question,
state secrets, forum non conveniens, and the act of state doctrine
provide a formidable arsenal with which defendants may dis-
miss ATS cases. By invoking executive primacy, the federal gov-
ernment procured the dismissal of ATS and other law of nations
147. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676–77 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350, § 2(a), note, and
S. REP. NO. 102–249, pp. 1671–1672, and citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350; 18 U.S.C. §
2340A(b)(2) (2000); 18 U.S.C. §1091(e)(2)(D) (2006 ed., Supp. V); S. REP. NO.
102–249, p. 4 (1991); H.R. REP. NO. 102D–367, pt. 1, at. 4 (1991); see also In-
ternational Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disap-
pearance, art. 9(2), Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, 85, arts.
5(2), 7(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U. N. T. S.; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S. T. 3316;
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internation-
ally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 28, 1973, 28 U.S.T.
1975; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565; Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 reporters’ note 1, at 257 (1986).
148. S. REP. NO. 102D-249 Cong., 1st Sess., at 4 (1991).
149. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010).
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cases repeatedly between 2002 and 2012.150 In one case, it made
perhaps the most fulsome such argument on record:
150. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) (arguing
that ATS should be unenforceable where it might be “impinging on the discre-
tion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs,”
even though a past Congress passed and the President signed the ATS); El-
Shifa Pharmaceutical Indus. Co. v. United States, 402 F. Supp. 2d 267 (D.D.C.
2005), aff’d, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (suit for damages from
allegedly wrongful bombardment and false accusations of illegal activity pre-
sented political question); Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc.,
572 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2009) (suit for damages involving a military contrac-
tor’s negligence in Iraq presented a political question); Harbury v. Hayden, 522
F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (government’s alleged facilitation of murder of U.S.
citizen’s husband in Guatemala presented political question); Corrie v. Cater-
pillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, at 1031–32, (W.D.Wash. 2005) (corporation’s
alleged aiding and abetting of war crimes and human-rights violations in Israel
and Palestine presented political question); Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d
427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Defense Department’s alleged deportation of the lo-
cal population of an island in the Indian Ocean during the Cold War presented
a political question); Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (Secretary of State’s alleged condoning of military coup and related
abuses presented a political question); Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (suit for damages by victims of Japanese war crimes in Asian countries
presented political question); El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Indus. Co. v. United
States, 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Takings Clause claim arising out of
missile strike presented political question); Vine v. Republic of Iraq, 459 F.
Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2006) (claim based on detention and cruel and inhuman
treatment of Americans by government of Iraq in 1990), rev’d on other grounds
by Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2008), rev’d on other
grounds by Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 2183 (2009), and vacated, 330
F. App’x. 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and aff’d sub nom. Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 330
F. App’x. 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009); In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, aff’d sub
nom. Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co, 517 F.3d
104 (2d Cir. 2008) (involving claims of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes including interference with births within and health of communi-
ties in Vietnam due to aerial herbicide spraying by United States); Corrie v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1022–23 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (involving
death of an American in home demolition carried out by Israel with bulldozer
whose acquisition was funded by United States), aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir.
2007); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,No. 1 Civ. 9882
(DLC), 2005 WL 2082846, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005) (involving claim that
oil company placed its property and personnel at disposition of government
engaged in genocidal clearances of indigenous communities from their ances-
tral homes); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005) (involv-
ing military contractor’s culpability for abuse of detainees in Iraq); Schneider
v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (involving claim by children and estate of Chilean general killed in mili-
tary coup in which National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger was allegedly
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At bottom, this litigation seeks to challenge the means by
which the United States prosecuted the Vietnam War, and in-
eluctably draws into issue the President’s constitutional Com-
mander in Chief authorities and invites impermissible second-
guessing of the Executive’s war-making decisions. . . .
First, adjudication of plaintiffs’ international law claims would
require this Court to pass upon the validity of the President’s
decisions regarding combat tactics and weaponry, made as
Commander in Chief of the United States during a time of ac-
tive combat. Such judicial review would impermissibly en-
trench upon the Executive’s Commander in Chief authority,
and run afoul of basic principles of separation of powers and
the political question doctrine. . . .
[T]he President’s actions displace any contrary international le-
gal norm as a rule of decision in this case. Because these con-
trolling executive acts preempt the application of customary in-
ternational law in the domestic legal system, the Court should
reject any claims based upon such law. . . .
culpable); Mahorner v. Bush, 224 F. Supp. 2d 48, 52, 53 (D.D.C. 2002) (case
involving U.S. military aid to Israel, allegedly used in violation of international
law, presented political question). Other cases, while not successfully invoking
the political question doctrine to obtain dismissal of an ATS case, appealed to
similar policy arguments to get the cases thrown out. See Br. for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254 (2d.
Cir. 2007) (No. 05-2326) (appealing to foreign policy of political branches to
oppose treating material support to apartheid as crime against humanity); Br.
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12–15, 18–23, Talisman Energy su-
pra note 111. See also Br. for Pet’r, Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S.Ct. 2183,
129 S.Ct. 1935, 129 S.Ct. 1936 (2010) (Nos. 07-1090, 08-539), 2009 WL 434719,
at *16 (S. Ct. brief filed Feb. 19, 2009) (appealing to foreign policy decision by
President Bush to preserve Iraqi assets from U.S. victims of 1990s-era cruel
and inhuman treatment by Iraq); Br. in Supp. of Pet’n for Certiorari, Republic
of Iraq v. Simon, 129 S.Ct. 2183, 129 S.Ct. 1936 (S. Ct. 2010), 2008 WL
4678679, *15–19 (S. Ct. brief filed Oct. 22, 2008) (No. 08-539) (same); In re S.
African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 276 (Bush administration sug-
gested that ATS suit against corporations that aided and abetted crimes in
South Africa might infringe on unitary executive branch’s foreign affairs au-
thority to engage with human-rights-abusing governments); Br. for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, No. 07-919
(S. Ct. 2008) (similar); Statement of Interest of U.S. Dep’t of State, Rio Tinto,
221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d, Sarei, 671 F.3d 736, 756 (9th Cir.
2011) (ATS claim by victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity in
Papua New Guinea might impinge on the foreign policy of the United States
to persuade the government to continue a “peace process”).
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The Executive branch has significant expertise in the formula-
tion and interpretation of both treaties and customary interna-
tional law, which this Court should accord the substantial def-
erence it is traditionally afforded. . . .151
This argument recalls the dictum, condemned by James Mad-
ison and the other Founders, that the occupant of the presidency
may “of himself make a law.”152 The state secrets doctrine, which
was originally quasi-contractual in nature, or perhaps an inci-
dent of U.S. federal employment law, also increasingly invali-
dates constitutional and ATS claims against unlawful executive-
branch policies.153 The doctrine of forum non conveniens is very
useful to defendants who argue that the courts of some other ju-
risdiction with a greater interest in an ATS claim should decide
it using their local law.154 Revealingly, the courts’ alleged con-
cern with the vagueness and judge-made character of the law of
nations under the ATS155 sometimes vanishes when defendants
appeal to the copious judge-made doctrines of political questions,
state secrets, forum non conveniens, executive deference, and
sovereign/government contractor immunity.156 The veneer of
151. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 43–44 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (emphasis added) (quoting Statement of Interest of the United States).
152. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 527–28 (2008) (citing THE FEDERALIST
No. 47 (James Madison)).
153. The government supported the dismissals of at least two such cases im-
plicating state secrets, and perhaps more of them, from 2005 through 2010. See
ACLU v. NSA, 128 S. Ct. 1334 (2008), denying cert. to 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.
2007); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc); E1-Masri v. Tenet, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp.,
391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005); Jamie Rodriguez, Torture on Trial: How the
Alien Tort Statute May Expose the United States Government’s Illegal Extraor-
dinary Rendition Program through Its Use of a Private Contractor, 14 ILSA J.
INT’L&COMP. L. 189 (2007); Jeremy A. Telman, Intolerable Abuses: Rendition
for Torture and the State Secrets Privilege, 63 ALA. L. REV. 429 (2011).
154. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
aff’d, 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster
at Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
155. See, e.g., In re Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem.
Co., 517 F. 3d 104, 122 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 1663 (Mar.
2, 2009).
156. See, e.g., Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1084, 1087 (state secrets privilege is
ambiguous “judge-made doctrine with extremely harsh consequences”); Br. for
Earthrights International as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Pet’n for Certiorari, at
17–18, Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 09-1262) (“Doctrines
such as head-of-state immunity, government contractor immunity, and even
the sovereign immunity of the United States itself are all federal common-law
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“neutrality” underlying political-question dismissals of legal
claims disappears when one realizes, with Professor Foley, that
“too much political consensus” threatens militarism.157
Government contractors have made particularly extensive use
of the political question doctrine since 2006, on the basis that
any judicial action in a case involving a defense contractor would
intrude upon “derivative sovereign immunity”158 and the “sepa-
ration of powers.”159 Traditionally, the government contractor
defense did not shield gross violations of human rights, or mass
atrocities under international law.160 It remains to be seen
whether the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision that the “political
question” doctrine may not displace lawsuits based on a “specific
statutory right” will roll back at least one of these develop-
ments.161 There is an analogy to be drawn between a government
doctrines, not derived from international law.”) (collecting cases) id. at 18; Alan
Clarke, Rendition to Torture 97 (2011) (“state secrets privilege in U.S. law is a
judge-made principle that protects state secrets from disclosure in court pro-
ceedings. . . .); Harold Hongju Koh, International Business Transactions in
United States Courts, 261 RECUEIL DES COURS 13, 148, 157 (1996) (although
“statutory forum non conveniens” involves transfer to another federal judicial
district under 18 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “judge-made” version involves dismissal un-
der Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1982)); Michael D. Ramsey, Es-
caping “International Comity,” 83 IOWA L. REV. 893, 893 (1998) (suggesting
that international comity is imprecise doctrine).
157. See Brian J. Foley, Reforming the Security Council to Achieve Collective
Security, in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONALLAW 591 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca
M. Bratspies eds., 2008).
158. Defs.’ Reply Br. on Appeal at 4–6, 13, 15, Al Shimari v. CACI Premier
Technology, Inc., 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. Brief filed Apr. 23, 2010) (No. 09-1335)
(citing Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 2009)).
159. Id. (citing Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., 572 F.3d
1271 (11th Cir. 2009); Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1022–
23 (W.D. Wash. 2005); Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l Inc.,No. 1:08-cv-827, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29995, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2009); Whitaker v. Kellogg Brown
& Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (M.D. Ga. 2006); Smith v. Halliburton Co.,
No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006)). See also Br. for
Appellant, at 4, 6, El Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 07-5174) (en banc); Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190,
197 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
160. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 18–19, 52,
58 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Decl. of Professor Jordan J. Paust, In re Agent Orange, 373
F. Supp. 2d 7, 2005 WL 6041235 (Jan. 5, 2005).
161. Zivotofsky v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).
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contractor’s claim that its actions have been endorsed by the gov-
ernment, and the claim in Zivotofsky that the question regarding
the status of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital was “political.”162
The Obama administration echoed the Bush administration’s
position on executive branch primacy. In 2010, it opposed the
courts adjudicating complaints that foreigners were injured
within the meaning of state tort laws by “government contrac-
tors who provide services to the U.S. military in war zones. . .
.”163 Its brief warned that federal court jurisdiction over such
matters threatens the unitary executive by “second-guessing
military judgments, burdening the military and its personnel
with onerous and intrusive discovery requests, and otherwise in-
terfering with and detracting from the war effort.”164 In 2011, it
suggested that there should be no “cause of action by foreign na-
tionals against U.S. officials based on allegations of abuse in mil-
itary detention” where the “military setting in a foreign country
. . . raises a threshold question whether a federal common-law
cause of action based on the jurisdictional grant in the ATS
should be created in these circumstances.”165 The administration
urged the Supreme Court to let stand the D.C. Circuit’s decision
in an ATS case to “free military commanders from the doubts
and uncertainty inherent in potential subjection to civil suit.”166
Many of the discretionary doctrines are purportedly justifiable
by reference to the institutional incompetence of the courts in
foreign-affairs matters. Several opinions of the Roberts Court al-
lege that the courts are ill-equipped to decide foreign-affairs
cases.167 However, “[d]amage actions are particularly judicially
manageable.... The granting of monetary relief will not draw the
162. Id.
163. Br. for United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Carmichael v. Kellogg,
Brown & Root Services, Inc., 572 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2009) (No. 09-683) (U.S.,
filed May 28, 2010).
164. Id.
165. Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Saleh v. Titan Corp.,
No. 09-1313 (filed May 2011), http://www.jus-
tice.gov/osg/briefs/2010/2pet/6invit/2009-1313.pet.ami.inv.pdf (citing Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725–28 (2004); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527,
532 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
166. Id. at 4 (quoting Saleh v. Titan, 580 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
167. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727
(2010) (“when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in
[the national-security] area, ‘the lack of competence on the part of the courts is
marked.’”) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981)).
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federal courts into conflict with the executive branch.”168 This is
particularly true where a damages claim involves a former re-
gime or regime official, or a regime’s ultra vires actions not in
support of legitimate state sovereignty or international rela-
tions, such as genocide, terrorism, or persecution, rather than
war.169 In such situations, there is little risk of contradicting a
clear “political decision already made,” or contradicting support-
ing pronouncements by the executive branch on the same ques-
tion.170 Moreover, once a decision has already been made, an
award of compensation for injuries to private parties as a result
168. Gordon v. Texas, 153 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1998).
169. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e doubt
that the acts of even a state official, taken in violation of a nation’s fundamen-
tal law and wholly unratified by that nation’s government, could properly be
characterized as an act of state.”); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582–
83 (6th Cir. 1985) (“International law recognizes a ‘universal jurisdiction’ over
certain offenses . . . based on the assumption that some crimes are so univer-
sally condemned that the perpetrators are the enemies of all people.”); Doe v.
Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1285–86 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (opining that torture and
religious persecution were both unlawful even in China and therefore were not
clothed with immunity); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
(“[A]cts . . . [such as torture] hardly qualify as official public acts.”);
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Judgment, in XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 233 (1947)
(“The principle of international law, which, under certain circumstances, pro-
tects the representatives of a state, cannot be applied to acts which are con-
demned as criminal by international law.... He who violates the laws of war
cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state,
if the State in authorizing action moves outside its competence under interna-
tional law.”); Regina v. Bartle, ex parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581, 593–95 (H.L.
1999) (suggesting that acts of torture were not “official acts” after military coup
in Chile). Cf. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,
405 (1990) (federal judicial intervention in foreign affairs is less problematic
where foreign government no longer exists or there is an international consen-
sus that it acted unlawfully) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 423 (1964)); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727–28 (noting that ATS jurisdiction
might be most problematic where “potential adverse foreign policy conse-
quences from the recognition of additional causes of action” will result).
170. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier
Technology, Inc., 679 F.3d at 232 (Wilkinson, J., joined by Niemeyer and
Shedd., JJ., dissenting) (noting that Congress had condemned ultra vires acts
of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison); Br. for Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Ntzebesa v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 509 F.3d 148, 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2006)
(No. 05-2326), 2005 WL 6111792, at *24 (2d Cir. brief filed Nov. 22, 2005) (“Un-
less it was U.S. foreign policy to perpetrate such violations (which neither de-
fendants nor amici assert), adjudicating plaintiffs’ claims will not contradict
foreign policy judgments of the political branches.”).
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of its violating domestic or international law is not a “political
question,” but a judicial one.171 Therefore, applications of stat-
utes to concrete cases or controversies “merit no special defer-
ence” to the executive.172
C. The Culmination of Impunity Theory in the Cases of 9/11
and the South Sudan Genocide
Many of these trends converged in Presbyterian Church of Su-
dan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.173 and In re Terrorist Attacks on
September 11, 2011 (the 9/11 case).174 Issues of corporate com-
plicity, sovereign immunity, the unitary executive branch, and
the scope of the ATS made these very complex cases precedent-
setting. The precedent was arbitrary injustice.
In Talisman Energy, the court initially ruled that corporations
are capable of “violating the law of nations,” based on precedents
from “the trials of German war criminals after World War II.”175
The court articulated a knowledge standard for non-state mate-
rial supporters of foreign war crimes or persecutions of civil-
ians.176On appeal, the Bush administration argued that the ATS
had no extraterritorial application, that Sudan and other states
enjoyed sovereign immunity for genocide under the FSIA, that
holding American corporations liable for aiding and abetting
genocide threatened President Bush’s foreign policy preferences,
and that the justifiability of aiding and abetting genocide is a
political question that the “courts lack institutional authority
171. Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 701–04 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
172. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 697 (2004) (court would
not withhold adjudication under ATS of Holocaust-era reparations claim).
173. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp.
2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
174. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
175. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp.
2d 289, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing United States v. Krauch (The I.G. Farben
Case) (Dec. 28, 1948), in 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1153 (1952);
United States v. Krupp (The Krupp Case) (July 31, 1948), in 9 TRIALS OFWAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAWNO. 10, at 467, 667 (1950).
176. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 321–24.
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and ability to decide.”177 The brief noted that each of these doc-
trines was “equally applicable to the Kiobel district court’s de-
termination that claims for aiding and abetting liability are
available under the ATS.”178 The Second Circuit handed major
victories to the Bush administration in both Talisman Energy
and Kiobel, sharply curtailing extraterritorial ATS claims in
those decisions by requiring corporations to act with a purpose
to commit genocide or some other crime in Talisman Energy, and
declaring that corporations were not liable under the ATS in Ki-
obel.179 The Obama administration opposed the initial result in
Kiobel, but argued for the final, Justice Roberts position.180
In the 9/11 case, the court found that two Saudi officials had
sovereign immunity for their alleged efforts in financing the
massacre of nearly 3,000 Americans on 9/11.181 The lawyers for
9/11 victims, first responders, and survivors had alleged that the
officials aided banks and charities, as well as Taliban-era Af-
ghanistan, in working directly with al-Qaeda leadership to send
tens of millions of dollars to al Qaeda, some of which reached the
177. See Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 1–15, 20–21, Talis-
man Energy, No. 07-0016, supra note 111.
178. Id. at 5 n.1 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Corp., 456 F. Supp.
2d 457, 463–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
179. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244,
247–48 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 79 (2010); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 472 (2011);
Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 73 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[U]nder
the current law of this Circuit, as established after the district court decided
this case, the ATS claims against [a bank] cannot be maintained in any event
because the ATS does not provide subject matter jurisdiction to enable us to
entertain civil actions against corporations for violations of customary interna-
tional law.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2009), www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/153976.pdf.
180. See Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 24–32, Kiobel, No. 10-
1491; Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, 43–44, Kiobel, No. 10-1491,
http://:www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-
1491rearg.pdf (“The Alien Tort Statute should not afford a cause of action to
address the extraterritorial conduct of a foreign corporation when the allega-
tion is that the defendant aided and abetted a foreign sovereign. . . .. We cer-
tainly have foreign relations interests in avoiding friction with foreign govern-
ments; we have interests in avoiding subjecting United States companies to
liability abroad.”).
181. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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9/11 hijackers beginning in the year 2000.182Confronted with the
clear legislative history of the FSIA to the effect that sovereign
immunity does not extend to foreign officials or even to foreign
heads of state, the Second Circuit deferred to the view of the
Bush administration that sovereign immunity should be so ex-
tended anyway.183 It later found that Saudi Arabia, Saudi offi-
cials, and the Saudi High Commission had immunity despite the
9/11 families’ allegation that Saudi Arabia and these officials
participated in a scheme to create banks to support al Qaeda and
appointed senior members of al Qaeda to international chari-
ties.184 This decision was surprising because an Act of Congress
clearly stated that sovereign immunity shall not apply to: (1)
“act performed in the United States in connection with a com-
mercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere,”185 or (2) a case of
“personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, oc-
curring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or
omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of
that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or
employment; except . . . the exercise or performance or the fail-
ure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of
whether the discretion be abused. . . .”186
Subsequently, the Second Circuit disregarded several U.S.
statutes, many treaties, three Supreme Court decisions, and the
practice of numerous U.S. allies in ruling that there was no
182. Br. of Appellants on Personal Jurisdiction (Consolidated) at 16–47, 102–
51, Federal Ins. Co. v. Saudi Arabia, 538 F.3d 71 (No. 06-319) (2d Cir. brief
filed Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.motleyrice.com/files/docs/Docket%20298%20-
%20Appellants%20Consolidated%20Brief%20with%20Respect%20to%20Per-
sonal%20Jurisdiction.pdf.; see also, Saudi Princes Seek Immunity Against
9/11 Lawsuits, CNN (Oct. 17, 2003),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/10/17/saudis.lawsuit/.
183. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71,
83 (2d Cir. 2008). But see Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205, 200 (2d Cir.
2004); but see also Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010); Enahoro v.
Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2005).
184. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 398-400, Federal Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
538 F.3d 71 (No. 06-319); Br. for Appellees at 4–5, In re Terrorist Attacks on
September 11, 2011, 538 F.3d 71 (2d. Cir. 2008).
185. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2008). The plaintiffs in the 9/11 case pointed out
that Saudi officials used banks, charities, and other financial institutions in
such schemes. See supra note 182, 184.
186. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(5)(A) (2008).
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agreed-upon definition of terrorism for ATS purposes.187 Only by
totally ignoring international legal definitions of terrorism could
187. The Second Circuit’s opinion devoted one paragraph to this issue and
cited only one of its own prior decisions, a concurring opinion from 1984, and a
handful of district court cases to resolve an issue that lies at the center of war,
peace, and the law of nations in the twenty-first century. See In re Terrorist
Attacks on September 11, 2001 (Al Rajhi Bank, Saudi American Bank, Saleh
Abdullah Kamel, Dallah al Baraka Group LLC, and Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami
Trust), No. 11-3294-cv(L), 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 7669, at *15-16 (2d Cir. Apr.
16, 2013). As the plaintiffs pointed out, there are the following sources for a
law of nations definition:
The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bomb-
ings, U.N.T.S. (Dec. 15, 1997), and the International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Dec. 9, 1999), 2178
U.N.T.S. 197, which defined it as an act to do death or violence to a
civilian or a government employee in order to intimidate a civilian
population or coerce a government to do a specific act.
The Act to Combat International Terrorism of 1984, which referred in
section 101(a) to a definition for purposes of U.S. law;
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990/1992, section 2333 of which referred
for a definition of terrorism for purposes of a civil damages remedy to
a definition under U.S. law;
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, section
2332b of which referred for a definition of terrorism to the interna-
tional law offense of violent acts “calculated to influence or affect the
conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate
against government conduct,” see 110 Stat. 1293;
10 U.S.C . § 950v(b)(24), which defines it as killing or grievous wound-
ing of a person to intimidate the government or civilian population
into certain conduct, among other things;
18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which defined it as “a violation of section 32, 37,
81, 175, 229, 351, 831, 842 (m) or (n), 844 (f) or (i), 930 (c), 956, 1091,
1114, 1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 2155, 2156,
2280, 2281, 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332f, 2340A, or 2442 of this title [18],
section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284), section
46502 or 60123 (b) of title 49, or any offense listed in section 2332b
(g)(5)(B) (except for sections 2339A and 2339B) or in preparation for,
or in carrying out, the concealment of an escape from the commission
of any such violation, or attempts or conspires to do such an act”;
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (which
referred to several definitions);
Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 285–94, (which referred
to several definitions under U.S. and international law); and
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the court conclude that the offense was less definite than the of-
fense of piracy, which was also defined in various ways before
1789.188
These shifts have not gone unnoticed around the world. An-
other non-party of the ICC, the Republic of Turkey, has noted
through its Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu that the United
States has been “attempting to establish an international order
based on a security discourse, thus replacing the liberty dis-
course that emerged after the collapse of the Berlin Wall.”189
Likewise, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has insisted that it has
the sovereign right to provide material support to terrorism.190
Executive Order No. 12947, 3 C.F.R. 319 (1996), which referred to a
definition for U.S. purposes.
Br. of Appellants on Failure to State a Claim (Consolidated) at 123–39, Federal
Ins. Co. v. Saudi Arabia, 538 F.3d 71 (No. 06-319) (2d Cir. brief filed Jan. 20,
2012), http://www.motleyrice.com/files/docs/Docket%20299%20-%20Appel-
lants%20Consolidated%20Brief%20re%20Dismissals%20for%20Fail-
ure%20to%20State%20a%20Claim%20and%20FSI.pdf; Br. of Appellants on
Personal Jurisdiction (Consolidated) at 56–77, Federal Ins. Co. v. Saudi Ara-
bia, 538 F.3d 71 (No. 06-319). Several of these materials deal specifically with
banks’ support for terror. International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (Dec. 9, 1999), 2178 U.N.T.S. 197; 18 U.S.C. § 2339A;
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct 2705; 137 CONG. REC. S. 1771
(daily ed. Feb. 7, 1991). See also Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-
Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d
44, 49–50 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that “both the Executive and Legislative
Branches have expressly endorsed the concept of suing terrorist organizations
in federal court”).
188. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
189. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy, FOREIGN
POLICY (May 20, 2010), http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-prob-
lems-foreign-policy/. According to Armenian claimants, Turkey is a key bene-
ficiary of the doctrine of a unitary federal authority over foreign affairs, exec-
utive branch at its center. Cf. U.S. Supreme Court Not to Review Genocide-era
Insurance Claims Cases, PANARMENIAN (June 10, 2013), http://www.panarme-
nian.net/eng/news/161661/. Cf. also American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539
U.S. 396 (2003).
190. Br. of Appellant at 2, 8, In re Terrorist Attacks, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir.
2008) (No. 06-0319) (2d Cir. brief filed Jan. 5, 2007). Although the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia insisted that the 9/11 Commission report found that neither the
kingdom nor any senior officials were found to have “individually funded” the
perpetrators, there was no finding that junior officials did not do so or that
more senior officials did not “collectively” fund the perpetrators through char-
ities or other pools of funding. Id. at 1. Moreover, the 9/11 Commission did not
have subpoena power over Pakistani or Saudi documents, and received poor
cooperation from portions of the U.S. government. See Mark Mazzetti, Panel
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Saudi Arabia presaged the opinion of Justice Roberts in Kiobel
by arguing that there is no U.S. federal court jurisdiction over
terrorist acts planned outside the United States by foreign sov-
ereigns.191 Concerned for the fate of its many war criminals, in-
cluding criminal industrial dynasties, the Federal Republic of
Germany has asserted that “overbroad exercises of jurisdiction
are contrary to international law,” especially for “conduct that
took place entirely within the territory of a foreign sovereign,”192
Study Finds That CIA Withheld Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/22/washington/22intel.html?page-
wanted=1&_r=1&hp&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1198350491-9XKfuW5/RLUihEn-
pPBCEzQ9/11u; see also Benjamin DeMott,Whitewash as Public Service: How
The 9/11 Commission Report Defrauds the Nation, HARPER'SMAG., Oct. 2004,
http://harpers.org/archive/2004/10/whitewash-as-public-service/. The briefing
by 9/11 victims on this issue illustrates the incompleteness of the report. See
supra notes 182, 184, 187; Burnett v. Al Baraka Investment & Dev. Corp., 292
F.Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2003).
191. See Br. of Appellant at 33–34, In re Terrorist Attacks, supra note 190.
192. Br. for the Federal Republic of Germany, the Association of German
Chambers of Industry and Commerce, the Federation of German Industries,
CBI, Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, Economiesuisse, and the Interna-
tional Chambers of Commerce of Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom as Amici Curiae in Supp. of Resps. at 1-2, Kiobel, No. 10-1491
(S. Ct. brief filed Feb. 2, 2012). Germany alleged that its own courts provided
an adequate forum for victims of human-rights violations with “due process,”
that the ATS promotes “forum shopping by the plaintiffs’ bar” and “cost inten-
sive discovery,” and that ATS litigation might “interfere with The Federal Re-
public of Germany’s sovereignty, thus hugely affecting The Federal Republic
of Germany’s governmental interests in a way that is unacceptable.” Id. at 8,
10, 13. An article in a German publication sheds light on “due process” in Ger-
man courts for victims of Germany’s crimes: “The ‘Committee of State Secre-
taries on the Protection of State Secrets,’ . . . established an interdepartmental
task force, which included representatives of the Foreign Ministry, [and it] . . .
warned German war criminals against traveling to countries where they had
been sentenced in absentia and could now face arrest.” Klaus Wiegrefe, The
Holocaust in the Dock: West Germany’s Efforts to Influence the Eichmann Trial,
DER SPIEGEL (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-
holocaust-in-the-dock-west-germany-s-efforts-to-influence-the-eichmann-
trial-a-756915-2.html. This is corroborated by an American magazine: “In
judging those who operated the [Nazi] machinery of death, postwar German
courts actually employed SS standards of legality, designating as perpetrators
only those individuals who could have been condemned by the SS’s own tribu-
nals.” Lawrence Douglas, Ivan the Recumbent, or Demjanjuk in Munich,
HARPER’SMAG., Mar. 2012, http://harpers.org/archive/2012/03/0083831.
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even as its own courts adjudicated genocide cases arising out of
Rwanda and Yugoslavia.193
III. PLANNING A REVIVAL OF THEORIGINALUNDERSTANDING IN
THEWAKE OF KIOBEL
A. Reparations as Counter-Impunity Policy in the Service of
World Peace
Just as the Founders conceived of the ATS as preventing war
by achieving justice in concrete cases, so have experts on mass
atrocities looked to reparation in the courts as a path to interna-
tional peace. Juan Mendez, who for more than two years served
as Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide to the U.N.
Secretary-General, has argued that offering reparations to the
victims of atrocities may help reconcile ethnic and intercommu-
nal divisions.194 For example, it is vital to reassure victims of the
right of return to homes and villages, restitution of property and
livelihoods, and access to land and water.195 States have a legal
duty to ensure that justice is served, he argued.196 While the Ge-
neva Conventions obligate states to remedy grave breaches of
the laws of war in international conflicts, an analogous norm of
customary international law applies to internal armed con-
flicts.197 The U.N. General Assembly declared in 2006 that vic-
tims of war crimes or gross human-rights abuses have a right to
“redress” and “justice.”198
193. See Andreas Illmer, German Court Opens Rwandan Genocide Trial,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.dw.de/german-court-opens-
rwandan-genocide-trial/a-14772468 (“[A] former Rwandan mayor, is accused of
organizing three massacres in which over 3,700 Tutsi were killed after seeking
refuge in churches.”); JOHN B. QUIGLEY, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: AN
INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS 46 (2006) (Bosnian Serb tried in Germany for
genocide “against Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia”). See also Rwandan Militia
Leaders Face German Court Over Alleged War Crimes, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (May
4, 2011, 10:57 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/04/rwanda-mi-
litia-leaders-trial-germany (“Two Rwandan militia leaders have gone on trial
in Stuttgart . . . for the killing of scores of civilians in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.”).
194. See A History of Genocide, YOUTUBE (Jan. 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2wnPox-DXh0.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. U.N. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Rep-
aration for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law
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Reparations have been among the first instincts of the inter-
national community when confronted with genocide and other
mass atrocities. In 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres called for Turkey
to return the homes and businesses of “non-Moslems” who were
victims of “massacres in Turkey perpetrated during the war,”199
and the British Embassy at Constantinople established the Ar-
menian-Greek Section in order to “obtain the restitution of their
rights to owners of Christian properties which had been confis-
cated.”200 In the American zone of occupied Germany, the Jewish
Restitution Successor Organization searched for and redistrib-
uted Jewish property, aided displaced Jews in Germany, and re-
built synagogues to reestablish Jewish cultural and religious
life.201 Pursuant to the Dayton accords resolving the Bosnian-
Croatian-Serbian war of 1992-1995, the international commu-
nity ushered in new “Bosnian constitutional arrangements” de-
signed to reverse and memorialize past ethnic cleansing.202 In
Rwanda, the government made available procedures for the res-
titution of “homes and lands.”203 Restitution is contemplated in
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147,
at 3, U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006). The General Assembly added
that “national funds for compensation for victims should be encouraged.” Id.
See also VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY DISCOURSE
1 (Thorsten Bonacker & Christoph Safferling eds., 2013).
199. TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS AND
TURKEY (The Treaty of Sèvres) arts. 142–44, signed Aug. 10, 1920, 15 AM. J.
INT’L L. 179, 209–11 (Supp. 1921).
200. VARTKES YEGHIAYAN, BRITISH REPORTS ON ETHNIC CLEANSING IN
ANATOLIA, 1919-1922: THE ARMENIAN-GREEK SECTION, at xxvi (2007) (citation
omitted).
201. Associated Press, Heirless Jews to Rebuild Synagogues, EVENING
INDEPENDENT, Aug. 18, 1948, at 1.
202. Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes (signed Decem-
ber 14, 1995), 35 I.L.M. 75, 77–90 (1996); Constitution of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, 35 I.L.M. 117 (1996) (setting forth constitutional guarantees for vital
interests of minorities going forward); Agreement on Commission to Preserve
National Monuments, 35 I.L.M. 141 (1996) (setting forth procedures to “decide
on petitions for the designation of property having cultural, historic, religious
or ethnic importance as National Monuments”); Agreement on Refugees and
Displaced Persons, 35 I.L.M. 136 (1996) (creating an independent “Commission
for Displaced Persons and Refugees” to reverse ethnic cleansing of the war).
203. U.N. OFFICE FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS/INTER-AGENCY DISPLACEMENT
DIVISION, U.N. HABITAT, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FORHUMAN RIGHTS, U.H.
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, U.N. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL
ORGANIZATION, THENORWEGIANREFUGEECOUNCIL (NRC)& THENRC INTERNAL
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other cases, ranging from 1912 to 2006, and from Europe to Af-
rica to Asia.204
B. The Role of the ICC in Awarding Counter-Impunity Repara-
tions
The Rome Statute looks beyond restitution and compensation
to peace-building by “rehabilitation” of the victims.205 The ICC’s
Trust Fund for Victims contends that rehabilitation could theo-
retically reintegrate unlawful combatants into civil society, in-
cluding children conscripted into unlawful service as soldiers.206
More completely than a criminal conviction, execution, or term
of imprisonment, compensation and rehabilitation of the victim
can bring about transitional justice by offering remedies for suf-
fering, illegality, and degradation.207
The ICC is empowered to assess blame in episodes of mass vi-
olence; such findings may help to mobilize nations to prevent a
recurrence. Truth-related measures are deemed “satisfaction;”
they include disclosure and verification of the full facts sur-
rounding a historical episode.208 Other “satisfaction” remedies
include the confirmation of the location of abducted persons and
protection of witnesses; official acceptance of responsibility and
restoration of the reputations of the victims; administrative and
judicial sanctions against the systems that led to the victimiza-
tion; and education and training to prevent violations.209 In one
DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE, HANDBOOK ON HOUSING AND PROPERTY
RESTITUTION FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS 27 (Mar. 2007),
http:www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/pinheiro_principles.pdf. See also
id. at 82 (under Rwandan scheme supported by United Nations, “the original
inhabitant maintained the right to immediate restitution should they return
home,” while any trespasser or legitimate “secondary occupant was then given
two months to vacate the premises voluntarily,” with the government being
charged to locate a dwelling or building materials to secondary occupants un-
able to find a place to live on their own).
204. Cf. id. at 27–28, 33, 77–78 (listing Croatia, Czechoslovakia, Kosovo,
Iraq, South Africa, and Sudan).
205. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 75.
206. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Trust Fund for Vic-
tims’ First Report on Reparations, para. 317 (Sept. 1, 2011).
207. Id. para. 6.
208. Id. para. 327.
209. Id. See also Adrian Di Giovanni, The Prospect of ICC Reparations in the
Case Concerning Northern Uganda: On a Collision Course with Incoherence?,
2 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 25, 41–42 (2006) (“The UN’s Basic Principles on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation list five basic categories of reparations: . . .
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innovative program, communities collaborate on a “collective
history” of crimes in order to ascertain their causes and prevent
their recurrence.210 Allied to satisfaction is the process of guar-
anteeing non-repetition of violations of the law of nations, such
as by legal reform and monitoring of the causes and risks of fur-
ther conflict.211
Reparation, broadly construed to extend to rehabilitation, sat-
isfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition, could be a peaceful
solution to wars. The “supreme international crime”212 has been
identified as “recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies” or “as an instrument of national policy,” as op-
posed to “the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of
whatever nature . . . by pacific means.”213 Forcing nations to bear
(iv) satisfaction, which is fairly broad and would include such varied measures
as public apologies, truth-finding processes, [and] sanctioning perpetrators”).
210. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Trust Fund for Vic-
tims’ First Report on Reparations, para. 338 (Sept. 1, 2011).
211. Id., para. 338–40; Giovanni, supra note 209, at 42. See also Basic Prin-
ciples and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶ 23 (Mar. 21, 2006):
Guarantees of non-repetition should include, where applicable, any or
all of the following measures, which will also contribute to prevention:
(a) Ensuring effective civilian control of military and security forces;
(b) Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by inter-
national standards of due process, fairness and impartiality; (c)
Strengthening the independence of the judiciary; (d) Protecting per-
sons in the legal, medical and health-care professions, the media and
other related professions, and human rights defenders; (e) Providing,
on a priority and continued basis, human rights and international hu-
manitarian law education to all sectors of society and training for law
enforcement officials as well as military and security forces; (f) Pro-
moting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in par-
ticular international standards, by public servants, including law en-
forcement, correctional, media, medical, psychological, social service
and military personnel, as well as by economic enterprises; (g) Pro-
moting mechanisms for preventing andmonitoring social conflicts and
their resolution. (paragraph breaks omitted)
212. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal Court to
Punish Aggression, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 551, 552 (2007) (Sympo-
sium—Judgment at Nuremberg) (quoting The Judgment: The Nazi Regime in
Germany, THE AVALON PROJECT, available at http://ava-
lon.law.yale.edu/imt/judnazi.asp (last visited April 3, 2015)).
213. Roger S. Clark, Nuremberg and the Crime Against Peace, 6 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 527, 540 (2007) (Symposium—Judgment at Nuremberg)
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the full social and human costs of their military “solutions” could
promote adherence to the norm of pacific settlement.214
C. Remedying Defects in the ICC Compensation Process
The ICC’s compensation process is experiencing growing
pains, which are nevertheless amenable to being fixed in the not-
too-distant future, assuming that the jurisprudential will is
there to fix them. First, at least one judge opines that victims
are not able to marshal new evidence, find new witnesses, elicit
new testimony from documents and witnesses, or advance new
legal theories.215 Judge Van den Wyngaert argues there must be
a unitary prosecutor, not multiple prosecutors, which would be
“totally unfair.”216 She contends that victims’ rights must not
come at the expense of the rights of the accused under the ICC
statute.217 This is a rejection of the idea of “equal access to jus-
tice” in international criminal proceedings.218
(quoting International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sen-
tences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 218 (1947) (quoting Treaty Between the United
States and Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instru-
ment of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, art. 1, 46 Stat. 2343, 2345–46, 94
L.N.T.S. 59, 63 (1929))); see also Timothy Murphy & Jeff Whitfield, Excerpts
from the Nuremberg Trials, 6 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 5, 26–27 (1995/1996) (“Any
resort to war-to any kind of a war-is a resort to means that are inherently
criminal. War inevitably is a course of killings, assaults, deprivations of liberty,
and destruction of property. An honestly defensive war is, of course, legal and
saves those lawfully conducting it from criminality.”) (quoting Opening State-
ment of Chief Justice Robert H. Jackson, TRIALS OF THEMAJORWARCRIMINALS
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (Secretariat of the Tribunal,
ed. and trans., 1947)); id. (“Of course, it was, under the law of all civilized peo-
ples, a crime for one man with his bare knuckles to assault another. How did
it come that multiplying this crime by a million, and adding fire arms to bare
knuckles, made it a legally innocent act? The doctrine was . . . foul [and] con-
trary to the teachings of early Christian and international law scholars such
as Grotius. . . .”).
214. Cf. Wing, supra note 131, at 427 (“We, as a country, need to shift from a
policy that sells weapons and starts wars to one that fosters peace and under-
standing.”).
215. Hon. Christine Van den Wyngaert, Victims Before International Crimi-
nal Courts: A Challenge for International Criminal Justice, Address at the
Frederick K. Cox International Law Center’s Klatsky Seminar in Human
Rights (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DYb19TIPOBU.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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Second, there is the question of whether sufficient resources
will be found to pay reparations. Victims have submitted more
than 2,000 applications for compensation to the ICC, which,
multiplied by the average award for serious injury or death at
the U.N. Compensation Commission in 1995, would result in $6
million in awards, perhaps $10 million accounting for inflation
since 1995.219 Judge Wyngaert cites the “financial crisis” for the
idea that there is not enough money to fund compensation for
victims of mass atrocities.220
Donations from States Parties have materialized to fund reha-
bilitation, if not much compensation. By 2013, a representative
of Botswana praised the ICC at the 12th Assembly of States Par-
ties for having aided “more than 110 thousand victims and their
families through the Trust Fund for Victims.”221 The Trust Fund
for Victims claims to be funding services for 110,000 victims of
mass atrocities “in northern Uganda and the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo– including access to reproductive health services,
vocational training, trauma-based counselling, reconciliation
workshops, reconstructive surgery and more. . . .”222
Third, the process is very slow. The formalities required of vic-
tims who appeal to the ICC for compensation result in a “long
and cumbersome” path to receiving aid.223 Out of 9,910 applica-
tions for participation, which require “supporting evidence,” only
a third were allowed to participate by late 2011.224 The number
of victims allowed to participate was 127 in Prosecutor v.
219. See MARK J. FINDLAY, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 110 (2013); U.N. Compensation Commis-
sion Governing Council, Report and Recommendation Made by the Panel of
Commissioners Concerning the Third Installment of Claims for Serious Per-
sonal Injury or Death (Category “B” Claims), at 12, U.N. Doc. No.
S/AC.26/1995/6 (Dec. 13, 1995), http://www.uncc.ch/sites/default/files/attach-
ments/documents/r1995-06.pdf.
220. Van den Wyngaert, supra note 215.
221. Quoted in, TFV Receives Unprecedented Support at 12th Assembly of
States Parties, TRUSTFUND FORVICTIMS (Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.trustfund-
forvictims.org/news/tfv-receives-unprecedented-support-12th-assembly-
states-parties-0.
222. At Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, U.K. Foreign Sec-
retary Hague Announces £ 1 Million Contribution to TFV, TRUST FUND FOR
VICTIMS (June 12, 2014), http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/news/global-sum-
mit-end-sexual-violence-conflict-uk-foreign-secretary-hague-announces-
%C2%A3-1-million-con.
223. Van den Wyngaert, supra note 215.
224. Id.
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Lubanga, 266 in Prosecutor v. Katanga, and 1,889 in Prosecutor
v. Bemba.225 Perhaps as a result of competition between the
court’s own lawyers and judges and the victims for scarce funds,
no reparations had been awarded by mid-2011, nearly a decade
after the ICC’s creation.226 In 2012, the ICC declined to order
that the Trust Fund for Victims compensate any specific victims
of the crimes within its jurisdiction that had been committed in
the DRC.227 The draft ICC budget numbers for 2012 sought €10.3
million for victim-related investigations and participation, not
including the portions of the prosecutors’ and judges’ salaries
spent on victim-related issues.228 In fall 2013, the ICC was una-
ble to report that any specific compensation awards had been
225. See id. See also Christine Van den Wyngaert, Victims Before Interna-
tional Criminal Courts: Some Views and Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge, 44
CASEW. RES. J. INT’L L. 475, 481–82 (2011), The case of Situation in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo (Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo), involved
conscription into service as child soldiers, inflicting trauma through exposure
to combat and violence, and the loss of childhood education and innocence. See
id. at 494; see also Case No. ICC-01/04-01/046, Trial Chamber I, Public Re-
dacted Version of Trust Fund for Victims’ First Report on Reparations, para.
303 (Sept. 1, 2011). In such a case:
if compensation were to be considered as part of a reparation order, . . .
then Chambers would need to determine an amount equivalent to the
harm suffered by the child soldiers and indirect victims. Chambers will
also need to consider factors related to the fact that the damage varies
from one victim to another, depending on gender, age, duration of time
with the militia, and violence suffered or committed by the child. . . .
Rehabilitation is expected to rescue the children from their newly ac-
quired identity of a young person who exerts violent power over adult ci-
vilians by bringing them back to a pre-war state of innocence, vulnerabil-
ity and need for guidance.
Id., paras. 305, 317.
226. Van den Wyngaert, supra note 215.
227. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v.
Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/046, para. 289 (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1447971.pdf.
228. See ICC Assembly of States Parties, Proposed Programme Budget for
2012 of the International Criminal Court ¶ 20, ICC-ASP/10/10 (July 21, 2011),
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/ICC-ASP-10-10-ENG.pdf. Cf. also
Van den Wyngaert, supra note 215. The international criminal tribunals for
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda spent more than $1.2 billion in the first 14 years
of operation. See Sonja Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: Inter-
national Justice Beyond Crisis Situations, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1257, 1276 n.97
(2007).
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issued.229 Victims from Uganda have decried the process as a
“waste of time.”230 Others have acted as if it is possible that per-
petrators will admit their crimes under the victims’ pressure.231
Fourth, the ICC has expressed doubt about whether states
should take responsibility for their officials’ mass atrocities.
Judge Wyngaert emphasizes the distinction between “repara-
tions against states” and “against a convicted [natural] per-
son.”232 Although the state or non-state group that the person
led or fought for will likely have assets, there is a reluctance to
use doctrines such as respondeat superior or state responsibility
to attribute individual actions to collectivities. This will make
the compensation process futile, because most suspected perpe-
trators may have exhausted their personal wealth by the time a
trial could be held.233
Finally, to the extent that compensation is tied to a guilty ver-
dict, it will be greatly delayed and probably denied. There were
more acquittals than convictions in the first decade of the ICC’s
operation.234 The court’s report on the period from mid-2012 to
mid-2013 indicated that only one conviction was reached out of
fourteen individual perpetrators’ cases and active cases or inves-
tigations involving fourteen countries.235 If the perpetrator is a
fugitive like Joseph Kony or Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the vic-
tims’ cases may not be brought, or may not begin to be heard.
The ICC referral of the situation in Darfur, Sudan, is more than
a decade old.236 Victims are whipsawed because nation-states,
229. SeeU.N. Secretary-General, Report of the International Criminal Court,
para 4, U.N. Doc. No. A/68/314 (Aug. 13, 2013). The Court was able to report
that it had held or planned to hold six or more seminars. See id., paras. 108–
13.
230. Quoted in JUAN CARLOS OCHOA, THE RIGHTS OF VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROCEEDINGS FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 258 (2013) (in-
ternal block quotation omitted).
231. See FINDLAY, supra note 219, at 110.
232. Van den Wyngaert, supra note 215.
233. See id.
234. See William Schabas, The Banality of International Justice, 11 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 545 (2013).
235. Cf. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 229, para. 5.
236. See S.C. Res. 1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); Press Release, U.N. Security Council,
Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan to Prosecutor of Interna-
tional Criminal Court (Mar. 31, 2005),
http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm; UPI, Darfur Situation Frus-
trates ICC (June 6, 2013), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Spe-
cial/2013/06/06/Darfur-situation-frustrates-ICC/UPI-12611370527325/.
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which could pay compensation, are not accountable, while indi-
viduals, who are theoretically accountable, cannot pay compen-
sation post-trial.237
To contribute to a solution of these problems, the United Na-
tions itself could theoretically adequately fund the Trust Fund
for Victims sufficiently to pay all reparations. Judge Wyngaert
mentioned that a fund of one million Euros would support an
award of 500 euros per each admissible victim in a case such as
Prosecutor v. Bemba. 238 The permanent five members of the
U.N. Security Council, and their key allies such as Germany, Ja-
pan, and Saudi Arabia, have more than adequate funds with
which to contribute to the cause of victim compensation at the
ICC. China has a thriving trade with Sudan, whose victims ap-
pear at the ICC;239 it has more than $1 trillion in reserves, and
has earned more than $1 billion per day in surplus foreign ex-
change revenue.240 Britain and France sold large quantities of
weaponry to Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya, despite widespread
237. Cf. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v
Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/046, paras. 125–26, 269 (Aug. 7, 2012),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1447971.pdf; Press Release, ICC,
Lubanga Case: Trial Chamber I Issues First ICC Decision on Reparations for
Victims, U.N. Doc. No. ICC-CPI-20120807-PR831 (Aug. 7, 2012),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/
situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/press%20re-
leases/Pages/pr831.aspx (“Mr. Lubanga has been declared indigent and no as-
sets or property referable to him have been identified to date.”).
238. Van den Wyngaert, supra note 215. This figure is far below what the
Author believes that the U.N. Compensation Commission paid claimants be-
tween 1992 and 1995 for death or serious bodily injury occasioned by Iraq’s
war against Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, or $3,400 per claimant.
239. A Moral Sense, Divestment from Sudan, ECONOMIST (May 10, 2007),
www.economist.com/node/9153622; Helene Cooper, Darfur Collides With
Olympics and China Yields,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007, at A1; Lucien J. Dhooge,
Darfur, State Divestment Initiatives, and the Commerce Clause, 32 N.C.J. INT’L
L. & COM. REG. 391 (2007); Jonathan Holslag, China’s Diplomatic Victory in
Sudan’s Darfur, SUDAN TRIBUNE (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.sudantrib-
une.com/spip.php?article23090; Jad Mouawad, Oil Wealth May Provide a Way
for Sudan to Avoid the Full Pain of U.S. Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2007,
at C3.
240. Michael Forsythe and Francine Lacqua, China’s Current-Account Sur-
plus May Shrink, Zhou Says, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 26, 2009, 1:29 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsar-
chive&sid=ajWVXL3E7ghM.
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suspicions that it had massacred dozens of prisoners in 1996.241
One might argue that the rich states have a moral obligation to
fund the ICC, because their globalized supply chains fund the
perpetrators of mass atrocities, according to the admissions, for
example, of the U.N. Security Council.242 Yet these powerful
states seemingly refuse to make mass atrocities a top priority in
their fiscal, foreign policy, and foreign aid programs and policies.
Thus, the ICC over the past decade may have been mostly a
mechanism for distribution of funds to lawyers, rather than from
perpetrators of mass violence to victims and their families, and
for the occasional publication of opinions, charges, warrants, and
other legal memoranda.243 Judge Wyngaert uses this record to
question whether victims’ participation could ever be useful, and
to argue that such participation could create only symbolic relief
and cause secondary victimization.244
CONCLUSION
During the Enlightenment, out of which the Constitution and
the ATS arose, “justice” was the dividing point between tyranny
and dissolution of the social contract, and the protection of hu-
man rights and private property. William Blackstone, one of the
key figures in the development of the common-law system in
Britain and the United States, wrote that “the public good is in
nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of
every individual’s private rights.”245 This is a classic statement
of liberal and Enlightenment political theory, and finds echoes
in John Locke, Thomas Paine, John Adams, Madison, Vattel,
and von Pufendorf. To them, a commonwealth or republic would
fail in important ways if it did not achieve justice.246 Jurisdic-
tion, or the ability to determine what the law is, is the basis of
most forms of justice.
241. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Libya: Gross Human Rights Viola-
tions Amid Secrecy and Isolation, AI Index No. MDE 19/008/1997 (June 25,
1997), http://www.archive.org/web/20021018104818/http://web.am-
nesty.org/web/content.nsf/pages/gbrcountry+page.
242. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1952, preamble, para. 5 (Nov. 29, 2010).
243. See infra n. 235 and accompanying text.
244. Van den Wyngaert, supra note 215.
245. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 134.35 (1765), available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s5.html.
246. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS, BK. II, § 84 (1759) (noting that
one nation is not required to respect another’s decisions in cases of “refusal of
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The Framers’ generation intended the ATS to enforce the “law
of nations.” Its courts looked to Grotius, Blackstone, and other
publicists of international law to define torts in violation of the
law of nations. One such tort, piracy, is a close analogue for
crimes against humanity and transnational dangers such as
genocide, enslavement of child soldiers, or terrorist massacres.
Today, transitional justice looks to the law of nations to rem-
edy mass atrocities and make a better future.247 Inattention to
justice perpetuates civil wars, genocide, mass refugee flight, and
destruction of essential infrastructure throughout Africa and
Asia. The Greek word for justice, δίκη, refers at the same time a
division or contradiction, as in a dichotomy, and uniting a people
or city by giving to each what is due to her, and assuring each
justice, [or] palpable and evident injustice”); David Kopel, Paul Gallant & Jo-
anne Eisen, The Human Right of Self-Defense, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 43, 78, 81–91
& n.258 (2007) (describing views of Adams, de Vattel, and von Pufendorf that
tyrants may violate social contract with offended subjects of the realm, result-
ing in right of self-defense by subjects); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 410–17 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (describing failure of a govern-
ment when rights of individuals are not protected as giving rise to rightful re-
sistance); THEFEDERALISTNO. 51 (Feb. 6, 1788) (JamesMadison) (“It is of great
importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression
of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the
other part.”); THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 232–95 (1969); VON
PUFENDORF, 2 DE JURENATURAE, BK. VII, ch 4, § 3, at 1011 (cited in note 132)
(1934) (1688) (declaring that “the chief end of states is that men should by mu-
tual understanding and assistance be insured against losses and injuries
which can be and commonly are brought upon them by other men, and that by
these means they may enjoy peace or have sufficient protection against ene-
mies.”). See also Louis Henkin, Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REV.
1023, 1028 (1989) (“The Americans came to see rights . . . as inherent rights
held by individuals prior to government and law, and not given away but re-
tained under government. . . . The move to independence, to revolution ‘as of
right,’ was blended with the idea of individual social contract, a contract . . .
between the individual and the government.”).
247. RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 47–69, 119–212 (2000) (describing
criminal trials, reparations, administrative remedies, and constitutional
changes after World War II, Balkan Wars, and Rwandan Genocide). See also
Maj. Leonard J. Law, Rule of Law in Iraq: Transitional Justice under Occupa-
tion, U.S. ARMY SCH. OF ADVANCED MIL. STUDIES (2004), http://han-
dle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA429242; Yoav Peled & Nadim N. Rouhana, Transitional
Justice and the Right of Return of the Palestinian Refugees, 5 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 317 (2004); Iavor Rangelov & Ruti Teitel,Global Civil Society and
Transitional Justice, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2011: GLOBALITY AND THE
ABSENCE OF JUSTICE 163–74 (2011).
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person of her rights.248 Justice is a bond among people that can
help make peace. It draws a line between a period of human
rights violations and unfairness, and a new period of legitimate
and lawful governance.
Unfortunately, both the law of nations and transitional justice
have withered in the United States since 2001. The doctrine of
non-extraterritoriality has gutted the ATS, because the statute
already had scant application to acts committed on U.S. territory
as a result of U.S. sovereign immunity and the frequent decision
by Congress to limit U.S. residents’ remedies for domestic viola-
tions of the law of nations.249 The executive branch, while asking
248. In early Greek, as in Homer, δίκη more often referred to a division of
classes (as between women and men), a ruling among competing claims (as
between kings and commoners), or a settlement of the natural order (as in the
transition from life to death), than to fairness or morality. See RICHARD
GARNER, LAW & SOCIETY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 6–8 (1987). In later Greek, and
particularly to the philosophers Plato and Aristotle, as well as to the poets such
as Hesiod, δίκηmeant fairness and legal rightness, and to the use of judgment
to resolve competing claims in a political way. See JEFFREYWALKER, RHETORIC
AND POETICS IN ANTIQUITY 128–30 (2000); HARVEY ALAN SHAPIRO, THE
CAMBRIDGECOMPANION TOARCHAICGREECE 133–36 (2007). Thus, in Plato’s Re-
public, justice or δίκη is what results when every citizen does her own job,
claims her own rightful share, and does not meddle in matters of no legitimate
concern to her. See NICKOLAS PAPPAS, ROUTLEDGE PHILOSOPHY GUIDEBOOK TO
PLATO AND THE REPUBLIC 22, 71–78, 185–86 (1995). Similarly, in English “jus-
tice” prevents tyranny by ensuring to the free their right of appealing the
courts for administration of controversy, in addition to petitioning the king and
parliament and keeping arms for self-defense. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1:134–35, 140–41
(1765), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/docu-
ments/v1ch16s5.html.
249. See Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2001) (dismissing petition
for a writ of habeas corpus filed by an individual on Texas’ death row, who was
only seventeen at the time of the murder for which he was convicted, based on
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, because the United
States Senate, in ratifying the treaty, had reserved the right to impose death
sentences for such crimes); United States v. Duarte Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1288
(11th Cir. 2000) (although the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights became the “supreme law of the land” upon its ratification by the Sen-
ate, it does not broaden protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause, or bar “a
prosecution in the courts of the United States despite an earlier prosecution
for the same offense in the courts of another state party.”); Kyler v. Montezuma
County, 203 F.3d 835 (10th Cir. 2000) (where plaintiffs alleged that a U.S.
county’s employees’ conduct amounted to torture in violation of the United Na-
tions Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Interna-
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the U.S. courts not to hear cases of genocide, terrorist massacre
as a crime against humanity, or torture, has declined to follow
the law of nations’ procedures for such cases, such as the ICC.250
The state secrets privilege, the doctrine that treaties are not
“self-executing,” and the forum non conveniens doctrine mopped
up many of the other law of nations cases that arose after 2001.
The original understanding of the law of nations may undergo
a revival at the ICC. Victims seeking reparations for mass atroc-
ities are appealing to that body to exercise jurisdiction over their
claims for relief. Matters such as Lubanga may someday resem-
ble Paquete Habana, a modest beginning out of which a vast su-
perstructure of ATS and other transnational litigation was built
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, court held that: “These provi-
sions call upon governments to take certain action and are not addressed to
the judicial branch of our government. They do not, by their terms, confer
rights upon individual citizens and, thus, petitioner does not have standing to
bring these claims.”); Dickens v. Lewis, 750 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir. 1984)
(dismissing claim by plaintiff who alleged that illegal seizure by ATF agents
violated the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); Johnson
v. United States, 1995 WL 713502, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 1997) (unpublished
table disposition) (dismissing complaint by a plaintiff to sue the United States
under the U.N. Charter for damages and an apology for human rights viola-
tions committed against slaves and their descendants, because federal govern-
ment had never consented to be sued under the U.N. Charter, and therefore
had sovereign immunity); Hawkins v. Comparet Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244
(C.D. Cal. 1999) (prisoner subjected to electric shock for acting in a disruptive
manner, who brought a section 1983 claim against Los Angeles County, a
judge, the sheriff, and other defendants, claiming that he was tortured in vio-
lation of various international instruments, had claims dismissed because
none of these instruments are enforceable in the federal courts, and Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention Against Tor-
ture, despite being ratified by U.S., are not self-executing and do not create a
private right of action).
250. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 119 n.16 (2d Cir.
2010) (“The United States has not ratified the [ICC] Statute. Under the Clinton
Administration, the U.S. delegation voted against the text [of it].”); id. (in 2002,
Secretary of Defense for United States justified non-participation due to “the
lack of adequate checks and balances on powers of the ICC prosecutors and
judges; the dilution of the U.N. Security Council’s authority over international
criminal prosecutions; and the lack of an effective mechanism to prevent polit-
icized prosecutions of American service members and officials”) (quoting Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Secretary Rumsfeld Statement on the ICC Treaty
(May 6, 2002)).
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in the 1990s.251 If there is no court to resolve disputes peacefully,
resort to war may be inevitable, as the Founders feared.
251. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)).
